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The Lumpkin Law School 
At the regular meeting of the  Trustees of the University of 
Georgia in 1859, the board determined to reorganize the University, 
and in the plan that  was then adopted i t  was determined to establish 
a law school, "in which facilities for  the best legal education would 
be afforded." In pursuance of the plan, on August 4, 1859, on mo- 
tion of Governor Herschel V. Johnson, Joseph Henry Lumpkin (the 
first Chief Justice of Georgia), William Hope Hull and Thomas R. 
R. Cobb were elected professors, and the law school opened in the au- 
tumn of that year. On December 19, 1859, by an Act of the  General 
hsembly of Georgia, the Lumpkin Law School was incorporated, and 
these three gentlemen were both the incorporators and the professors. 
From that time to the death of Judge Lumpkin in 1867 (Mr. Cobb 
having died in 1862), the Law Department of the University was 
conducted under the name of the Lumpkin Law School, and the grad- 
uates were awarded their diplomas by the Trustees a t  the regular 
Commencement. The exercises of the law school were suspended 
during the War between the States. Since 1867 the Law School has 
been conducted under the name of the Law Department of the Univer- 
sity of Georgia. 
SKETCHES OF FOUNDERS 
William Hope Hull was a t  one time law partner of Governor How- 
ell Cobb. He was a deep student of the  law. Added to broad schol- 
arship his was a well balanced temperament and judgment. His opin- 
ion was sought in many cases in which he did not appear. His  great 
strength lay in his ability to give wise counsel. 
Joseph Henry Lumpkin was Georgia's f i rs t  Chief Justice. To 
the decisions of the Court, rendered during the years shortly af ter  
its establishment, one must look for the systematizing, harmonising 
of the laws; the application of the laws to the affairs of the citizens 
of the State. That Chief Justice Lumpkin was easily f i rs t  in this 
work, no one, familiar with those early formative opinions of the 
Court, can doubt. 
Thomas R. R. Cobb was many minded. He won distinction in 
many fields; in education, religion, war, law. His impress upon the 
laws of the State is deeper than that  made by any other person. He 
was a lawyer in full practice, reporter for  the Supreme C o u r t 4 : l " -  .- 
piler of Cobb's Digest of the Laws of Georgia, and one of t6e coma 
mittee of three which codified the laws of the State. 'EL him fell 
largely the codification of the substantive law. The corhmittee- w.- , . - 
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ranged the laws by subjects, harmonizing them, omitted redundan- 
cies and repetitions, added new laws, and produced a symmetrical 
whole, a great law book, perhaps the f i rs t  of the kind in the Union. 
Unique is  the codification of the doctrines of equity, elsewhere there 
were codes of Procedure, this is a code of all the laws of the State. 
FOUNDATION A N D  GROWTH 
More than half a century ago these three distinguished Georgians 
founded a law school which exists today as  the Law Department of 
the University of Georgia. While methods of legal study and educa- 
tion have, in these years, changed, nay undergone a revolution, the 
great underlying principles of the founders are  today the inspiration 
of the teachers and the norm of the progress of this school. No men 
were by temperament and training better fitted to impress on the 
students the due relation of principles and practice, the accurate ad- 
justment of the laws to the law. Thus this school seeks to instill 
those unchangeable principles of the law which must animate all phil- 
osophically framed rules of conduct, and a t  the same time give actual 
practice as  f a r  a s  possible in the application of those rules. While 
i t  strives to attain a standard of excellence in the academic training 
of the lawyer, law is a business, the most intensely practical, of all 
human pursuits. 
The high standard of professional honor and courtesy set by the 
founders is  the priceless heritage of the school today. Unceasing 
effort in all the work of the school, is made to impress t he  student 
with the solemn responsibility of the lawyer, and the sacredness of 
the t rust  imposed upon him. The ideals of the school a re  high and 
clean. 
For many years the school has been moving forward steadily, and 
a s  rapidly as  the conditions in the state allow. More than ten years 
ago the Law Department became in  reality an  integral part  of the 
University, and the transfer from the Academic to the Law School of 
any but worthy men ceased. The adoption of the two years' course 
soon followed. The wisdom, if not the necessity, of that action was 
never doubtful. The efficiency of the work was more than doubled. 
The approval of the State Bar Association has been repeatedly ex- 
pressed. The election of additional teachers has been an untold ad- 
vantage. The requirement of fifteen academic units for entrance 
went into operatipn with the opening of the session of 1908, and has 
borne good frui t  in the better class of students admitted. 
Beginning with the autumn term of 1919, the course for grad- 
uation was extended to three years. The successful inauguration of 
this change was evidenced by the gratifying attendance upon the 
f i rs t  year course. Beginning with September, 1924, the entrance re- 
quirement is one year of college work. 
Among the many advantages offered by the school most worthy 
of note is the connection with the University. The advantages of 
this connection a t  once occur to the student. Access to the academic 
schools, the libraries, debating societies, participation in literary and 
other University activities, wider acquaintanceship with the young 
men of the Stat,e University fellowship is invaluable to the lawyer. 
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That an institution cherishing such ideals and earnestly en- 
deavoring to fulfill i ts  obligations to State and people receive the re- 
cognition of Georgia is  no surprise to i ts  alumni, and is a source of 
gratification to all friends of thorough training for  the practice of 
the profession. 
HISTORICAL 
In 1867 Benjamin H. Hill and William L. Mitchell were elected 
by the Trustees to fill the two vacancies. 
From the time of Mr. Hill's election to the United States Senate 
in 1877, his connection with the school was nominal, and the classes 
were under the sole care of Mr. Mitchell until 1881, when Pope Bar- 
row and George Dudley Thomas were elected professors of law. Dr. 
Mitchell died in 1882 and Mr. Barrow resigned in 1883. In  1884 
Andrew J. Cobb was elected, and from tha t  time until 1890 Mr. Thom- 
as and Mr. Cobb filled the Chairs. 
SKETCHES OF TEACHERS 
Benjamin H. Hill, a s  all know, was one of Georgia's greatest sons. 
As a logical debater he was supreme. His command of strong, force- 
ful language was unexcelled. He honored the State a t  the bar, in 
the United States House and Senate. 
William L. Mitchell was one of the most experienced teachers 
who ever filled a chair in the school. His knowledge of the under- 
lying principles of law was phenomenal. The teaching, in his day, 
was by daily quiz from text books. He never openel a book in class. 
His memory of the subject made i t  unnecessary. 
George Dudley Thomas, while a young man, went easily to the 
front of the bar. Few lawyers have in the same length of time at-  
tained such signal success as  he did. His mind was clear, analytical, 
and his ability to communicate his knowledge equalled his mental 
concept. 
Andrew J. Cobb was one of the  profoundest lawyers every living 
in the State. His opinions, a s  a Supreme Court Justice have been 
cited more frequently than those of any other member of that  Court. 
His temperament was equable, his manners courteous. In  express- 
ing his convictions he was fearless. Of him i t  was said: "He was 
strong as steel and pure as  prayer." 
In 1890, Howell Cobb was elected. In  1893 Mr. Thomas and Mr. 
Andrew J. Cobb having resigned as  regular professors, and become 
lecturers, Sylvanus Morris was elected. 
The chair of lecturer on Medical Jurisprudence was filled by Dr. 
R. D. Moore from 1873, to 1879 by Dr. R. M. Smith, from 1880 to 
1883 by Dr. John Gerdine, and in 1883 Dr. S. C. Benedict was elect- 
ed. In 1907, Dr. Benedict having resigned, T. F. Green was elected 
Lecturer on Medical Jurisprudence. In 1908, Mr. Green having re- 
signed, Dr. James C. Bloomfield was elected Lecturer on Medical 
Jurisprudence. 
From 1873 to the time of his death in January 1888, Chancellor 
P. H. Me11 delivered lectures on Parliamei~tary Law to the class in 
connection with the Senior class in other departments of the Univer- 
sity. In 1894 John D. Me11 was elected Lecturer on Parliamentary 
Law. 
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Dr. J. H. T. McPherson was elected Lecturer in Roman Law in 
1899. 
In 1900 Sylvanus Morris was elected Dean. 
In 1901 the Course of Study was extended from one to two years. 
In 1906 Thomas F. Green was elected Lecturer on Federal Pro- 
cedure. 
In 1908 Hon. Andrew J. Cobb was elected Lecturer on Procedure 
and Constitutional Law. 
In 1909, Hon. Howell Cobb having resigned as regular professor 
and having been made professor emeritus, Mr. Thomas F. Green was 
elected regular professor of Law. 
Hon. Howell Cobb died during the year 1909. 
In 1909, John D. Me11 resigned as Lecturer on Parliamentary Law. 
In 1912 Joseph S. Stewart was elected Lecturer on Parliamentary 
Law. 
In 1913 H. Abit Nix was elected Instructor in Law. 
In 1916 the Chair of Medical Jurisprudence was abolished. 
In 1918 Messrs. Green and Nix resigned and Messrs. Walter G. 
Cornett and Henry G. Howard were elected Instructors in Law. Mr. 
Howard was called to the military service, and resigned. Mr. Steph- 
en C. Upson was elected to the vacancy in 1919. 
In 1919, the building, the "Lumpkin Law School," was formally 
opened. 
In 1920 the course was extended to three years. 
The subjects of Parliamentry Law and Medical Jurisprudence 
are now in charge of Hon. George F. Gober and Prof. W. G. Cornett, 
respectively. 
In June 1921, the Faculty was reorganized, the three members 
in office being retained, Professors Cornett and Upson being made 
regular professors, and Hon. b d r e w  J. Cobb being elected a regular 
professor. In 1923 R. L. McWhorter was elected professor. 
In 1924 entrance requirement of one year of college work was 
adopted. 
In 1923, Robert L. McWhorter was elected instructor and in 1925 
was made full professor. 
In 1925, Hon. George F. Gober was elected President. 
In 1925, entrance requirement of two years of college work was 
adopted. 
EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES 
Some years ago the graduates and friends of the school pur- 
chased the present Law Building. The equipment and facilities are 
ample, except for the lack of library space and reading rooms. The 
library contains many valuable publications which are now procurable. 
Within the last two years additions of modern works, text-books, re- 
ports, digests have been made. The library is now as complete as 
any one of the size to be found in the State. 
GRADUATES 
To name the graduates of the school who have attained distinc- 
tion would too greatly extend this sketch. They have been United 
States Senators, Congressmen, Governors, and Chief Justice, and As- 
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sociate Justices of the State Supreme Court; Justices of the Court 
of Appeals; Judges of the Superior, City, County Courts, Solicitora 
General, and Solicitors of other Courts. In every legislature are 
found graduates of the School who take prominent part in the deliber- 
ations. In practically every County of the State the graduates of 
the School have taken and are now taking prominent position in the 
affairs of the community. I t  has been said by one, not a graduate, 
that ; 
"No single institution has made a deeper impress upon the life 
of the State than the University Law Department. During the half 
century of its existence nearly one thousand graduates have left its 
halls, whose lives and achievements in peace and war have blessed 
the State."- 
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Competitive Conspiracy 
HAROLD HIRSCH 
The limitations to which this article will be confined must f i rs t  
be stated. Unfair competition can readily be divided into two groups; 
the one dealing with "passing off", that  is, the selling of one man's 
goods as  those of another, whether by way of substitution or in- 
fringement of a trademark, the other dealing with what has been 
called "economic unfair competition", that is, any competition that  is 
not based upon efficiency. The former is based upon fraud and de- 
ception, while the latter is  based upon an  interference with the na- 
tural law of supply and demand. The former has been subject to 
equitable action for years, while the latter has been subject to legal 
review for  a comparatively short time, and the culmination is found in 
the legislation against "unfair methods of competition", commencing 
with the Sherman Anti-Trust Law,l and the interpretation thereof in 
the cases of the United States v. Standard Oil Company2 and United 
States v. American Tobacco Company," and ending with the passage 
of the Clayton Act,* and the Federal Trade Commission Act,6 and the 
interpretation thereof by many late decisions by our Supreme Court. 
I t  must be remembered that contracts in restraint of trade were 
invalid under the common law, that "passing off" has for  years given 
a right of action, but that "unfair methods of competition", except as  
above, find their condemnation in the last two mentioned statutes. 
A,s to what constitutes such methods is left finally to the Courts,B and 
to the decisions we must look for our boundary lines. With the gen- 
eral subject of "passing off" we are  not here interested, and with the 
subject of "unfair methods of competition" we are  only interested in 
one phase thereof, that is, the fiing of resale prices-price restrict- 
ion. And, we must assume for our present purposes that  the legisla- 
tion against restraint of trade by price restriction is based upon 
~ o u n d  economic principles, and no attempt will be made to discuss that 
phase of the situation. For those interested in this problem, refer- 
ence is made to the admirable work of William H. S. Stevens,7 article 
by Prof. Bruce Wyman,8 report of the Federal Trade Commission, 
statement by Mr. Justice Brandeis" and the report of the Special 
Committee of the United States Chamber of Commercelo. The eco- 
nomic argument is  well stated by the manufacture of trademarked 
goods, that  the merchant buys not only the product, but buys the name 
1 Act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, Chap. 646. 
2 221 u. S. 1 
3 221 U. 3. 106 
4 Act of Oct. 15, 1914, 38 Stat .  730 
5 Act of Sept. 26, 1914, 38 Stat. 717 
6 Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421. 
7 Unfair Competition-The University of Chicago Press 
Article by Prof. Bruce Wyman,  Vol. 42, July, 1912, Page  69, 
Annual of American .4cademy of Political Science 
9 Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
63rd Congress, 2nd and 3rd Sessions 
10 A brief concerning the Maintenance of Resale Prices 
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and good will, the market and waiting customers, and the manufac- 
turer should have the right of price control, while the price cutting 
merchant states that having purchased he should have the right to 
resell as he pleases. 
In so fa r  as  we are  now concerned the conflict is between the two 
well recognized legal principles. In the case of United States v. Col- 
gateu the Supreme Court announced that a manufacturer might le- 
gally refuse to sell his product to a dealer who cut prices that  the 
manufacturer had previously announced as  a minimum price12. This 
decision was undoubtedly based upon the fundamental principle that 
so long as the title to the product remained in the manufacturer, he 
could sell or refrain from selling as  he saw fit .  This was but follow- 
ing the doctrine of the Eastern States Lumber Association v. United 
Statesl-hen i t  was held that a "retail dealer has an unquestionable 
right to stop dealing with a wholesaler for reasons sufficient to him- 
self." In other words, i t  is now established beyond dispute "it is the 
right long recognized of a trader engaged in entirely private business 
freely to exercise independent discretion as  to the parties with whom 
he will deal"". On the other hand the purchaser has the undoubted 
right to sell the product he has purchased a t  such price as  he sees f i t  
to sell it, and the Courts have not yet held that selling a t  a loss consti- 
tutes unfair competition1% The question is, where do the respective 
rights and obligations begin, and where do they end? 
The vitals of the decision in the Raymond Bros. case revolves 
around the expression "independent discretion", and the sentence "an 
act lawful when done by one may become wrongful when done by 
many acting in concert, taking on the form of a conspiracy which may 
be prohibited if the result be hurtful to the public or to the individual 
against whom the concerted action is directed." In  other words, one 
can do by himself, and independent of others, what he can not do with 
others by way of conspiracy or agreement, implied or expressed. What 
is this competitive conspiracy, and what limitation has i t  engrafted 
upon the doctrine heretofore set out? The most illuminating decision 
on this subject is the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut 
Packing Company1(;. That decision "required the Company to cease 
and desist from carrying into effect its so-called Beech-Nut Policy by 
cooperative methods in which respondent and its distributors, custo- 
mers and agents undertake to prevent others from obtaining the com- 
pany's products a t  less than the prices designated by it-(1) by the 
practice of reporting the names of dealers who do not observe such 
resale prices; (2) by causing dealers to be enrolled upon lists of un- 
desirable purchasers who are  not to be supplied with the products of 
the company unless and until they have given satisfactory assurances 
of their purpose to maintain such designated prices in the future; 
(3) by employing salesmen or agents to assist in such plan by report- 
11 250 U. s. 300 
12 Frey v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 2081 
13 234 U. S. 600 
14 Federal Trade Commission 1. Raymond Bros., 263 U. S. 565 
16 Miles .Medicine C o .  v. Park & Sons, 220 U. S. 373 
16 257 U. .S. 441 
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ing dealers who do not observe such resale prices, and giving orders 
of purchase only to such jobbers and wholesalers a s  sell a t  the sug- 
gested prices and refusing to  give such orders to dealers who sell a t  
less than such prices, or who sell to  others who sell a t  less than such 
prices; (4) by utilizing numbers and symbols marked upon cases 
containing their products with a view of ascertaining the names of 
dealers who sell the company's products a t  less than the suggested 
prices, or who sell to others who sell a t  less than such prices in order 
to prevent such dealers from obtaining the products of the company, 
(5) by utilizing any other equivalent corporate means of accomplish- 
ing the maintenance of prices fixed by the company." It is well to 
note that  the Supreme Court reversed the finding of the Circuit Court 
of Appeals, but a t  the same time held that the order of the Federal 
Trade Commission was too broad. The Commission ordered the com- 
pany to  cease and desist "refusing to sell to any such distributors be- 
cause of their failure to  adhere to any such system of resale prices." 
The Commission was reversed because in the opinion of that  Court, 
while the facts appeared to  bring the case within the case of Miles 
Medicine Company v. Park17, nevertheless i t  regarded the cases as  
controlled by the decision in the case of United States v. Colgatel8. 
The Supreme Court in the Beech-Nut case discusses the two last men- 
tioned cases, and refers to its decision in the case of United States v. 
Schrader's Son, 1nc.l" and says: 
"In the subsequent case of United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. 
S. 85, this Court had occasion to deal with a case under the Criminal Appeals 
Act, wherein there was a charge that a manufacturer sold to manuhcturers 
in several States under a n  agreement to observe certain resale prices fixed 
by the vendor,-which we held to lbe a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
"In referring to the Colgate case we said: 'The court below misappre- 
hended the meaning and effect of the opinion and judgment in that  case. We 
had no intention to over-rule or modify the doctrine of Dr. Miles c medical Com- 
pany v. Park & Sons Co., (220 U. S.) where the effect was to destroy the dealers' 
independent discretion through restrictive agreements. Under the interpre- 
tation adopted by the trial court and necessarily accepted by us, the indict- 
ment failed to charge that Colgate & Company made agreements, either ex- 
press or implied, which undertook to obligate vendees to observe specified 
resale prices; and it was treated as  alleging only recognition of the manufac- 
turer's undoubted right to  specify resale prices and refuse to deal with anyone 
who failed to  maintain the same.' 
"In the still later case of Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Company. 4 1  
Sup. Ct. Rep. 451, wherein this court again had occasion to consider the sub- 
ject, it was said of the previous decisions in United States v. Colgate and 
United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., supra, 'Apparently the former case was 
misapprehended. The latter opinion distinctly states tha t  the essential agree- 
ment, combination or  conspiracy might 'be implied from a course of dealing 
or other circumstances.' 
"By these decisions it is settled that in prosecutions under the Sherman 
Act a trader is not guilty of violating its terms who simply refuses to sell 
to others, and he may withhold his goods from those who will not sell them 
a t  the prices which he fixes for their resale. He may not, consistently with 
the Act, go beyond the exercise of this right, and by contracts or combinations, 
express o r  implied, unduly hinder o r  obstruct the free and natural flow of 
commerce in the channels of interstate trade." 
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I t  is sufficient here to add that the Supreme Court a t  once upheld 
the doctrine announced in the Colgate case, but a t  the same time de- 
clared "from this course of conduct a court may infer * * * that 
competition among retail dealers is  practically suppressed * * *". 
The course of conduct in the Beech-Nut case, tha t  is  of interest here, 
is found in paragraphs one and three of the decision, the reporting of 
dealers who do not observe the resale prices. Interpretative of the 
Beech-Nut decision, we have the case of Hills Bros. v. Fderal Trade 
Comrnis~ion~~. The facts disclosed that Hills Bros, announced a min- 
imum resale plan, and learned when its minimum resale was violated 
through its salesmen and from competing retail dealers located near 
the dealer who was cutting the price. The Court stated the position 
of Hills Bros. as follows: "This brings us to the principal contenti011 
of the petitioner, namely, that i t  has simply fixed a minimum resale 
price for its coffee, and has refused to sell to dealers who will not 
maintain the minimum price, and that in so doing i t  has acted withill 
its rights and kept within the law." The Court then held: "If the 
petitioner has done nothing more than this, i t  will be readily conceded 
that the charge of unfair competition has failed." But the order to 
cease and desist was granted, due to the fact that the reports were 
made by salesmen and retailers. Moir v. Federal Trade Commission21 
and Q.  R. S. Music Company v. Federal Trade Commissionz2 follow 
the above decisions. These decisions show conclusively that although 
one has the right to refuse to sell and may withhold his goods from 
those who will not sell them a t  the prices fixed for  their resale, one 
can not go beyond that right, and by contracts or combinations, ex- 
press or implied, unduly hinder or obstruct the free and natural flow 
of commerce in the channels of interstate trade23, that one of the ob- 
structions is a conspiracy that is created when salesmen or competi- 
tors report a violation of a minimum price policy. Has the latter 
part of this conclusion been modified by other decisions, whereby 
the manufacturer can use a weapon to substantiate the right given 
in the former part thereof? Let  us for the moment consider the case 
of American Tobacco Company v. Federal Trade Commission24. 111 
that case the Tobacco Company "bluntly told its jobbers that if they 
were not interested in making a fair  profit and for notions of their 
own elected to sell a t  less than a living profit, the Company would 
feel a t  liberty to remove them from the list of direct customers." The 
Court held that such did not constitute a conspiracy. In United 
States v. Hudnut 25, Judge Hand stated: 
"1.t is hardly useful to review in detail the 73 casea of retailers to  whom the 
defendant sold its goods, and who were cut  aff for price-cutting, and reill- 
stated. These are 'but a small fraction of 40,000 customers. who purchased 
its perfumes and toilet articles. I should not regard the suit as a reasonable 
one, except for the recent case of the Supreme Court in Federal Trade Com- 
mission v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U. S. 441, 42 S. Ct. 150, 66 L. Ed. 307, 19 A. L. R. 
20 9 F. (2) 481. 
21 12 F. (2) 22 
22 12 F. (2) 730 
23 Colgate Case, supra. 
24 9 F. C2) 570, Certiorari Granted, 70 L. Ed. 
26 8 F. (2) 1010 
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882, decider1 by a narrow majority. That case, however, did not hold that. a 
suggestion by a. seiler to  his customer of a resale price. with a statement that 
further dealings would 'be discontinued if the customer cut the suggested 
~ r i c ? ,  was unlawful under the Sherman Act (Comp. St. Sec. 8820 et seq.) 
I t  is true that the distinction between a n  agreement by word or conduct 
to  maintain a reselling price on merchandise sold and delivered, and a warn- 
ing that, if such a price is not maintained, future srtles will be withheld, is 
delicate, and that the second may be accompanied by such circumstances a s  
to show conclusively that a' contract is r-tlly made. Yet there is a difference, 
and, if it is not observed, the right to refuse to  sell to a customer, who does 
not by his conduct satisfy his vendor, will disappear. Certainly reckless 
price-cutting cheapens a product in the eyes of the community, and often 
greatly injures its future marltetability and v<due. On the whole, .there were 
among the 73 cases very few instances indeed where Hudnut's salesmen, 
even with the inevitable enthusiasm of such persons, did anything 
like make an agreement to fix a resale price. The facts, taken ns a whole, 
more nearly resemble those in United States v. Colgate, 250 U. S. 300, 39 S. 
Ct. 465, 63  L. Ed. 992, 7 A. R. L. 443, and Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing 
CO., 256 U. S. 208, 4 1  S. Ct. 451, 65 L. Ed. 892; than those in Federal Trade 
Commission v. Beech-Nut Co., supra. See, also, my opinion in Baran v. Good- 
year Tire & Rubber Co. (D. C.) 256 F. 571." 
In the case of Toledo Pipe-Thrashing Machine Company v. Fed- 
eral Trade Commission2G, the Commissioner ordered the Machine 
Company, among other things, to cease and desist (3) by informingr 
dealers that price cutters reported, who would not give assurance of 
adherence to the suggested resale discounts, had been or would be re- 
fused further sales; (4)  by employing i ts  salesmen to investigate 
charges of price cutting reported by dealers. * * * The Court re- 
versed this par t  of the order, saying: 
***"Subdivisions 2. 3, and 4 specify acts which seem to us to be of ne- 
cessity reasonably incidental to the fair exerdise of this right of selection. 
They represent the irreduci'ble minirxum of means by which one who adopts 
the policy of not selling his goods to price cutters may endeavor to maintain 
that policy, and they indicate only that inevitable degree of 'co-operation' 
naturally and selfishly coming from dealers who uphold the system; and 
they should not be enjoined." 
The Court distinguishes the Beech-Nut case, supra, in the fol- 
lowing manner : 
"The Beech-Nut Case is not completely parallel, because in the present 
case we have no system of identifying marks, and no group of salesmen or 
agents engaged chiefly in finding and reporting violations, or at all in pen- 
alizing ofieders by diverting from them the retail business, nor yet the elab- 
orate plan of 'do not sell' lists, Wth  the accompanying co-operative effort to 
prevent other dealers from selling to the price cutters. We do have the 
general and encouraged practice by dealers to report, as  far a s  they happen 
to develop, .the names of price cutters and we do have the general 'practice 
,of refusal by the  manufacturer to sell to them further unless they agree to 
maintain the schedule. Whether these things amount to such 'co-operative 
methods' between the manufacturer and the dealers a s  the court refers to i.n 
the Beech-Nut Case, or are  merely a refusal to sell to price cutters, enforced 
by what so far a s  has been pointed out is the only available method, is not 
clear." 
It is also interesting to note what is said of the American To- 
bacco Case, supra, and the Hills Bros. Case, supra; 
"The two recent price-maintenance cases in the Second and Ninth Circuit 
Courts of Appeals (American Tobacco CO. v. F. T. C . .  9 F. (2) 570, Oct. 20. 
1925, and Hills Bros. v. F. T. C., 9 F. (2d) 481, January 4, 1926), although 
distinguishable in details, appear to us  fundamentally in conflict with each 
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other. I t  would seem that  the Tobacco Company and the  Wholesale Asso- 
ciation exercised a. concert of action ,to constrain t h e  price cutters,  a t  leart  
as much as did t h e  petitioner, the  Toledo Company, and  i ts  distributors in 
the present case. T h e  discuss:on by Judge Rogers of t he  controlling decisions 
and principles would support  the conclusion tha t  t he  practices of t he  Toledo 
Company a re  lau3ul. I n  the Hills Bros. Case, t he  co-opclation between pe- 
titioner and l ts  customers was no more in kind, though probably grea ter  in 
nmount, than we have here, and the opinion of Judge Rudkin concludes t ha t  
this kind of co-oyeration is t he  thing forbidden by the  rule of the Beech-Nut 
Case." 
And, but recently the  Circuit Court of Appeals in the  case of 
Cream of Wheat Company v. Federal Trade  Commission27 amended 
the order of the  Commission on objection made to  paragraphs 2 ( a )  
and (b), and paragraphs 4 and 6 .  The Court s ta t ing  the  proposition, 
as follows: 
"The objections to  paragraph 2 (a) a r e  tha t  the  petitioner construes It 
as directing petitioner to desist from securing f rom customers or prospective 
customers or from dealers o r  trade associations reports of customers, who 
fail to observe i ts  resale prices. 
"But t he  order does not war ran t  such a n  interpretation. The  language 
Is to desist from "soliciting a n d  securing" from customers, etc., such  infor- 
mation. uMerely securing the  information is  not prohibited, unless t he  infor- 
mation is also "solicited." If the  order had employed the  disjunctive "or" 
instead of the conjunctive "and," consel's contention would be entitled to  
greater consideration, a question not before us  and not decided. 
"This order does not prohibit t he  petitioner from acting on information 
received by it without solicitation, bu t  communicated to  it voluntarily by  
some of i ts  custome~ss, o r  from advertisements of price cuttings. This also 
~ppl ies  to the  objections to paragraph 2 (b). 
"Paragraph 4 only requires the  petitioner to desist from "employing i ts  
sales agents to assist  in such plan 'by reporting dealers who have failed t o  
observe its resale prices, ***  and  furnishing said agenLs the names of cus- 
tomers to whom i t  has refused fur ther  sales because of price cutt ing,  and  
instructing them not to  sell to such customers." The words "to assist" in  
such plans must  be  construed iln connection with paragraphs  2 (a) a n d  2 (b) 
"to solicit and secure," and  is limited to information solicited and secured 
from customers, etc., the  names of customers guilty of price cutt ing or in 
other words they must  not solicit customers to furnish them with information 
of those cutting prices of the articles manufactured and sold to the  trade by 
the petitioner, and  act on  information thus  obtained." 
And finally, the case of Ayer v. Federal Trade  Commis~ ion*~:  
"As long a s  the  manufacturer does not monopolize his line of PI-oducts 
and use unfair or fraudulent methods, he should be permitted to exercke the 
privilege which t h e  law accords him of selecting his customers a n d  refusing 
to sell to customers who undermine t h e  mavket by becoming price cutters.  
***No court has  gone so far  a s  to hold tha t  a n  occasional instance in the l)u#i- 
ness career of a firm as where a n  agent  has  solicited or urged a retailer not 
to cut prices, amounts to  a n  unfair  \business policy o r  const6tutes a method 
of merchandising which ifi condemned 'by the  act .  * * *  I t  ( the  respondent) 
had about eight thousand customers, and  there were  not more than fifty 
complaints of customers a s  price cutters. I t  did not seek ou t  such price cut-  
ters but from time to time they were reported by comgetitors in the  johbing 
and retail business. ***Very rarely %vas a n  investigation made by a sales- 
man or representative of t h e  petitioner (the respondent). I t  had 'hut nine 
Salesmen in its large business. No list of price cut ters  was  kept,  no system 
of follow-ups was pursued af ter  the form letter  I ~ S  sent  out,  and there was  
no estnbltished method of interviewing or keeping in touch with t he  retailer o r  
jobber. ***  Therc was no cooperation wi th  i t s  jobbers and retailers or oth- 
er distributors which was  effectual ei ther as a n  agreement,  expressed or im- 
plied, intended to accomplish purposes of price fixing." 
27 C. C. A. 8th Circuit, decided July  26, 1926. 
2s C, C. C. 2nd Circuit 
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These cases again substantiate the proposition that  one has the 
right to  select his customers, they also go to  the extent of holding that  
a manufacturer can suggest t o  his customers that  he will be discon- 
tinued unless a resale price is maintained, and that  reports can be 
used to maintain the right of selection, that  is, can secure the informa- 
tion without solicitation. 
Truly Judge Denison was correct when he stated "The state of 
the law as  t o  price maintenance may rightfully be said to be in 
conf usi0n".2~ 
The question that  seems to be open is, does the Beech-Nut Case 
hold that  the mere reporting of price cutting by competition and or 
salesman is a conspiracy that constitutes "unfair methods of competi- 
tion"? If i t  does, the decisions are  in hopeless conflict, and that  the 
right of selection of one's customers is t o  a great extent nullified; if, 
on the other hand, such does not constitute a conspiracy, the decis- 
ions can be reconciled. 
The basis of a conspiracy is a combination or  agreement, ex- 
pressed or  implied. Can i t  be said because a manufacturer announces 
a minimum resale problem, then receives information from a compet- 
itor of the person cutting prices, and cuts that person from his list, 
that  such constitutes a combination or agreement in restraint of 
trade? Does such constitute a conspiracy? I t  would certainly ap- 
pear that  such does not constitute an agreement. Another question 
might arise if under the given circumstances the price cutter should 
be cut off for  price cutting and then restored upon an agreement not 
to again cut prices. But this is an agreement and not a conspiracy. 
HAROLD HIRSCH, '01. 
of Candler, Thomson & Hirsch, 
Atlanta, Georgia. 
29 Toledo Case, supra. 
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The Courts and the People 
BY 
GEO. F. GOBER 
Our constitution provides:-All government or  right originates 
with the people, i s  founded on their  will only and is  instituted 
solely for the good of the  whole. Public officers a r e  t h e  trustees 
and servants of the  people and a t  all  times answerable to them. I t  
further assures the  right of freedom of speech. We could not af- 
ford to detract from the great  importance of these constitutional 
safeguards; they a re  necessary to preserve our liberties under our  
form of government. We have also the  slogan tha t  ours  i s  a gov- 
ernment by the people, fo r  the  people, which i s  brought for th  and  
made to do duty in  many political contests. These a r e  the  texts 
of every demagogue seeking office upon which he rings the  changes 
when he presents himself with a patriotic a i r  and saintly pose ask- 
ing the electroate to support him. He i s  either a reformer o r  icono- 
clast as his exigencies demand. Ignorant of the  past and with no 
care for the future he  paints a glorious rainbow of fu tu re  prosper- 
ity provided he be elected. H e  would t ea r  down old institutions fo r  
the sake of the space; a n  iconoclast never builds; he conceives his 
mission is to destroy regardless of value and intrinsic worth. Like 
a chameleon he takes on the cloro of his surroundings. If he offers 
a remedy i t  i s  usually empirical and untried. He promises many 
things impossible but anything to  catch his hearers. To listen to 
him, the Government is  all  wrong from top to bottom; officers a r e  
not doing their duty; g ra f t  controls and the jails and penitentiaries 
ought to be enlarged to accommodate the  delinquents. As a rule 
he is not taken seriously and like a storm soon blows over. Some 
demagogues write and others speak. 
The people rule and by majorities control. They, through their 
representatives framed our constitutions and ratified them. We live 
under a dual government; each one within i ts  powers i s  sovereign. 
The people elect the congress, the legislature and the executive offi- 
cers. They elect the judges, the solicitors general and the clerks and 
Sheriffs of the courts. Each one of these officers exercises dele- 
gated power given by the people; they a re  told by the laws where 
their authority begins and where i t  ends; what they can do and what 
they cannot do; their duties and obligations are  specifically defined. 
Every officer in this State must be able t o  point t o  some law tha t  
gives him the official authority that  he assumes to  exercise. 
The people making the laws and, electing the officers, they a re  
responsible for the courts. The Grand jurors and the traverse jur- 
ors are part of the people; the people furnish thd litigants and the 
witnesses;-they furnish the  criminals. It must be concluded tha t  
we live under a pure democracy and the people rule. 
Every citizen having a par t  in the government is privileged to 
criticise any officer and every official act not in conformity with the 
delegated power. Such criticism when fai r  i s  a patriotic duty. If  
any officer betrays his t rust  or any department of the government 
be not properly carried on, fa i r  criticism would call attention to the 
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fact and i t  would be remedied; if there be nothing wrong, confidence 
would be restored which is of greatest importance to any officer or 
department of government. 
There has been much said and written about a wave of crime. 
That  there have been many violations of the criminal law cannot be 
denied. It is not local. This condition exists from one ocean to the 
other; from Canada to the gulf; i t  has been magnified and held up 
a s  something for which the courts were responsible. I t  has been a 
great theme for demagogues. A physician when called to treat a pa- 
tient first  makes a diagnosis of the trouble; he determines what 
treatment is necessary and then from his professional knowledge he 
applies the remedy. 
We have more people in the United States than we ever had. I t  
is estimated we have a population of about 120,000,000. This is a 
great population, as  many as Rome ever had in the time of her great- 
est power. As a result we have more criminals-a greater variety of 
criminals. We have more money and property than ever before and 
more opportunity and inducement to steal. We have a large number 
who want to enjoy the luxuries the age affords and to do so without 
work. Clothes and high living, expensive hotels and bootleg liquor 
cannot be enjoyed whhout money and, criminals habituated to these 
things, feel that they must have them either one way or another. On 
this account we have mail robberies, burglaries and bank robberies 
often with murders attending to accomplish the purposes. If there 
be a wave of these crimes courts can no more ward i t  off than can 
physicians ward off a scourge of the plague. A court cannot move 
itself; the people must move i t  through indictments and the furnish- 
ing of the evidence. This is the work of the people through their se- 
lected officers. A judge is not a court anymore than a court is a judge. 
A court is a place where justice is judicially administered. A court 
is the assembling of the proper officers a t  a particular time and place 
fixed by law to  dispose of the business properly before it. 
Every important criminal case in the world today is broadcasted 
by the daily papers throughout the land. The newspapers a re  not t a  
blame for this since they print what the people want to read. Ger- 
ald Chapman, Dutch Anderson, Whittemore and many others have 
been on the front page during the last year with their pictures and 
doings as wonderful examples of the product of the criminal class; 
also the Hall case in New Jersey where i t  is charged a preacher and 
his female choir leader caught in flagrante delicto were murdered. 
The law abiding people reading about these things can well conclude 
that there is a wave of crime. 
In our diagnosis let us see further. We have more laws than 
we have ever had; more statutes to be enforced. In thirty-nine 
states last year thirteen thousand laws were passed. Ignorance of 
law excuses no one and the very minute each one of these was ap- 
proved by the Governor everybody was presumed to know them and 
held to be accountable for their violations. Many of these laws were 
necessary to prescribe the rights and obligations arising under our 
progress and complicated civilization. The automobile, the aeroplane, 
the radio and other things have required new statutes but many 
were the result of propaganda of one-eyed fanatics seeking to govern 
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the people by criminal statutes. Criminal statutes a re  important 
and necessary for  reasonable needs but no government can o r  ever 
has ruled a people by drastic criminal statutes and penalties. Henry 
VIII reigned thirty-six years and under his laws seventy-two thous- 
and during his reign were executed for  theft  and burglary. I t  was 
a capital offense to steal as  much as  twelve and one-half pence about 
twenty-five cents. There were many other trifling offenses pun- 
ished with death. He was followed by Mary who burned about two 
hundred a t  the stake as  heretics and non-confomists. Blackstone 
wrote his commentaries in 1765 and a t  that time there were in 
England one hundred sixty felonies punishable by death. There a r e  
only two now. In  America, during the  administration of John Adams 
the Alien and Sedition laws were passed. Under these laws i t  was 
said one could not criticise the cut of a Congressman's coat without 
violating the law. There were many convictions and on account of 
these laws and the party of Adams. was driven from power and the 
laws repealed. Jefferson went out of power rendered unpopular by 
the Embargo law, which was defied and repealed. Public sentiment 
was not in favor of the law for  the  reason tha t  i t  was unreasonable 
and deprived the citizens of fundamental rights. 
The judge under our system in misdemeanor cases has a wide 
discretion in the imposing of penalties. There a re  some that  assume 
to think that a judge is not doing his duty unless he imposes maximum 
penalties in every case. Ignorant of every principle of penology they 
set themselves up a s  critics over him. Some have gone so f a r  a s  to 
publish a list of his penalties with criticisms. It would be a dis- 
grace to the State if i t  had even one judge who could be intimidated 
from his duty under his oath of office by such contemptible doings. 
Any one ought to know there is  a difference in cases, in the circum- 
stances, in the defendants and their ability to pay, in their records 
and even where two defendants have violated the same criminal 
statute, circumstances often make a difference in their proper pen- 
alties. 
The question comes, if the laws and procedure are  wrong what 
remedies and changes should be made to better conditions? The 
demagogue attacks the present status but he does not offer any plan 
or suggestions for  betterment. Would he abolish the jury system 
and would such a remedy be successful? This system has been im- 
bedded in the laws of the English speaking people for a thousand 
years; it has been tried out and found to  be the greatest protection 
yet found for the rights and liberties of the citizen against arbitrary 
and irresponsible power; i t  i s  firmly fixed in our Constitution; to 
take away this right would be revolutionary and no thinking man 
would countenance such an undertaking. The protagonist would find 
it impossible. A defendant under our law is  presumed to  be inno- 
cent until the contrary is  made to appear by evidence beyond a reas- 
onable doubt. Would the reformer change this rule and set up that  
a defendant is presumed to be guilty when brought before the court 
on a criminal charge and put the burden on him to  show his in- 
nocence to the satisfaction of the courb? Such a proposition is ridi- 
culous and to state i t  i s  to argue its absurdity. Would the reformer 
insist a defendant should not have a fa i r  trial conducted under the 
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form of law? If such be his remedial change there is no room for  
further argument. If such changes were made we might as  well 
abolish the courts and live in a state of anarchy. Life, liberty, and 
property would have no protection; physical might would be the meas- 
ure of right and chaos would reign supreme. Such changes are  un- 
thinkable and no sane man would consider such propositions for  a 
moment. 
If our legal machinery is  not doing i ts  proper work we should 
remedy it. The law should be properly enforced but one who would 
criticize i t  should be able to  point out the trouble, t o  show where the 
defects a re  and let improvements be made. This duty is upon the 
people through their representatives in the law making body. The 
judges and Solicitors General do not belong to the criminal class; 
none of them have been indicted and convicted of violations of any 
criminal law. On the contrary Georgia has as  honest, able and hard- 
working judiciary as  she ever had; as  fearless as  ever before in the 
enforcement of the law. This may be said of the judges in all the 
courts from the highest to  the lowest. The people know the hard 
work the circuit judges are  compelled to do to dispose of the business; 
they work early and late often under disadvantageous conditions. 
The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court are  made up of justices 
whose ability and high professional character are  equal to that  of any 
who have ever presided in those courts. They work harder for  the 
money they get than do any other officers in the State. 
In the last fifty years only two justices of the Supreme court 
have been defeated for  reelection. This was not on account of their 
lack of ability as  lawyers nor on account of their wanting in char- 
acter a s  men but their successors were easily the peers in character 
and ability of any justices who had ever served in that  court. The 
members of the Court of Appeals have each served for  a long time 
and have shown by their work their great ability and appreciation. 
From these facts, with the power of the people a t  each recurring 
election to change the personnel of the courts, i t  may be safely as- 
sumed that  the people are  satisfied with their work. Many of our 
Superior Court judges have occupied the bench from twenty to thirty 
years. Their work is  done in the open; the public has a right to be 
present a s  it usually i s  and to see how the business is transacted and 
how the law is enforced. If the Judges had failed in administering 
even handed justice they would have been quickly retired. A judge 
in a circuit in Georgia who occupies the bench for  ten years if he has 
not maintained a character for uprightness and fair  dealing would be 
beaten in an election before the people by the litigants against whom 
he had decided cases and the criminals he had sentenced if they did 
not respect him. 
The lawyer has been prominent from the time of the colonies 
up to the present. He has done his par t  in civic affairs. He gave 
to the struggling colonies his advice and help. Lawyers wrote the 
Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation. 
They framed the Constitution of the United States and wrote the 
constitutions of the 48 states of the Union. They have helped to 
make the laws and have stood up against every effort to invade the 
rights and liberties of the people. Loyal to their profession and its 
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history and traditions the lawyers have always exhibited a conscen- 
811s of opinion and a brotherhood in effort against innovations and 
radicalism 
There has never been a time in the history of this country when 
there was a greater responsibility upon the legal profession than a t  
the present. 
During the f i rs t  development of the country there were few pub- 
lic question upon which there was not an  agreement of opinion. One 
was the protection of the colonies from the aborigenes; the other 
was the securing of their rights from England. There was little 
room for division. The great business of the f i rs t  colonies along 
with these things was agriculture, the cutting away of the forests 
and the development of the country. There were no great interests 
claiming advantages in their favor; there were none of the trouble- 
some matters that have since arisen; there was no race question and 
the population of the different colonies were not split up into factions 
over local questions. It is different to-day; there is  the great ques- 
tion as to whether the American people can govern themselves and 
perpetuate their government. As soon a s  the Constitution framed 
by our forefathers is thrown aside or emasculated the end will come 
in chaos and confusion. 
We speak of the traditions of the professions. To some the 
name is indefinite and uncertain. These a re  not defined in  t h e  
Code. We do not find the law of gravitation nor any of the un- 
alterable laws of chemistry in the Code nor in the Ten Command- 
ments, but this does not deny their existence. Some think 
that one is a good citizen who keeps out of the criminal 
court and is not sent to  jail. For  one to  perform his 
civic obligations, to be on the side of right against wrong, to regard 
the unwritten moral laws, and to do unto others as  he would have 
them do unto him, is  to fulfil the duties of a good citizen and this 
name is reserved for  such a member of a community. The traditions 
of the legal profession a re  the unwritten laws over and above the 
stringent regulations laid down in the code tha t  apply to the law- 
yers; they have been developed out of necessity from the relation tha t  
the bar sustains to  the people and the courts. This is a fiduciary re- 
lation involving t rust  and confidence and faith in loyal devotion. 
They spring from the obligation of the Bar  in the administration of 
the law. The lawyer who does not live up to them will fall short of 
success and fail in his professional career. 
It is demanded that  the highest standard of courtesy and in- 
tegrity shall be maintained and the work of the Courts and Bar  shall 
show an endeavor to give to every one his due. 
In the decisions of our higher Courts from their establishment 
till now, presided over by learned Judges, there may be found writ- 
ten and between the lines unwritten many of the traditions of the 
profession. These things show the heart  and soul of the men who 
wrote the opinions and a loyalty and appreciation of the proper 
standard of professional obligation and responsibility. There have 
been Judges of the Superior Court now dead and gone whose memories 
are cherished and whose administrations are  remembered from the 
impartial manner in which they meted out justice. The same can be 
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said of Judges now in commission. The lawyer who acting within the 
written law does not regard the traditions of the profession to pursue 
a fair  and honorable course of professional conduct is condemned by 
his fellows and will lose much by any, success achieved in such way. 
Rufus Choate at one time a United States Senator and the great- 
est trial lawyer this country ever produced said: 
"The necessity of the legal profession to the machinery of the 
social fabric in a free State is undeniable, and all history shows that 
popular liberty is best preserved, advanced and defended, where the 
legal profession is most unrestricted and free. There is, and there 
has been, no free profession in a despotism. When a celebrated Em- 
peror of Russia was in England, he expressed the utmost astonish- 
ment a t  the consideration in which the legal profession was there 
held. He declared that there never was but one lawyer in his do- 
minions, and he had caused him to be hung. And well he might, for 
such a man would be much in the way of the arbitrary proceedings in 
a despotic country. And even in free and enlightened governments, 
the popular excitement against private individuals, who happen to in- 
cur popular odium, is a dangerous element, which requires some 
check in the machinery of society itself, or great wrongs will often 
be done. When popular excitement is a t  the highest point-when 
popular clamor is loudest, and a victim is absolutely demanded, and 
seems necessary for peace, i t  is no small safety for every member of 
the community to have a class of men educated and trained for the 
purpose of defending those who can not defend themselves, to step 
forth as  the advocate, if not the friend, of those who are hunted by 
popular clamor, to give their time, their talents, their learning and 
their skill in defense of those whom all others desert-to breast the 
fury of the people-to stem the popular current-and to insist upon 
a full, fa ir  and impartial investigation before the victim is offered up. 
And when we reflect that men have been convicted and have suffered 
the extreme penalty of the law, whose innocence was afterwards made 
manifest to the world; that men have sometimes confessed them- 
selves guilty of crimes of which they were entirely innocent, we shall 
see more clearly the need of a legal profession, and shall be more cau- 
tious of condemning those who enter into their duties with zeal and 
energy and enthusiasm-who mean to do their whole duty irrespective 
of the applause or clamor of the public while laboring under tempor- 
are  excitement."-Reminiscences. 
Of Rufus Choate his biographer said :- 
"His manner to the judge was always in the highest degree defer- 
ential. I t  was almost filial. He had a feeling of poetic veneration 
for the judge, as the titular sovereign of that forensic scene which 
was the theatre of his love as  well as  of his labors. How splendid a 
character and how august a figure was his ideal of the judge, appears 
in the word-picture of such a magistrate, which he drew in his great 
speech in the Massachusetts Convention against an elective judiciary. 
He said every judge should have something of the venerable and il- 
lustrious attach to his character and function in the feelings of men; 
and he went on to observe: 'the good judge should be profoundly 
learned in all the learning of the law, and he must know how to use 
that learning. Will any one stand up here to deny this? In this 
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day, boastful, glorious for  i ts  advancing popular, professional, scien- 
tific, and all education, will any one disgrace himself by doubting the 
necessity of deep and continued studies, and various and thorough 
attainments, to the bench? He is to know not merely the law which 
YOU make and the legislature makes, not constitutional and statute 
law alone, but that  other, ampler, tha t  boundless jurisprudence, the  
common law, which the successive generations of the State have si- 
lently built up; that  old code of freedom which we brought with us 
in the Mayflower and Arabella, but which in the progress of centuries 
we have ameliorated and enriched and adapted wisely to  the  necessi- 
ties of a busy, prosperous and wealthy community,-that he must 
know. And where to find i t ?  In  volumes which you must count by 
hundreds, by thousands ; filling libraries ; exacting long labors ; the 
labors of a lifetime, abstracted from business, from politics; but as- 
sisted by taking par t  in an active judicial administration; such labors 
as produced the wisdom and won the fame of Parsons, and Marshall, 
and Kent, and Story, and Holt, and Mansfield. If your systern of 
appointment and tenure does not present a motive, a help for  such 
labors and such learning; if i t  discourages, if i t  disparages them, in 
so far it is a failure. 
'In the next place, he must be a man, not merely upright, not 
merely honest and well-intentioned-this of course-but a man who 
will not respect persons in judgment. And does not every one here 
agree to this also? Dismissing, for a moment, all theories about the 
mode of appointing him, or the time fo r  which he shall hold office, 
sure I am, we all demand, that  as  f a r  a s  human virtue, assisted by 
the best contrivances of human wisdom, can attain to it, he shall 
not respect persons in judgment. He shall know nothing about the 
parties, everything about the  case. He  shall do everything fo r  jus- 
tice, nothing for himself, nothing for  his friend, nothing for his pa- 
tron, nothing for his sovereign. If on the one side is the executive 
power, and the legislature, and the people-the sources of his honor, 
the givers of his daily bread-and on the other, an individual name- 
less and odious, his eye is  to  see neither great nor small; a t t e n d i n ~  
only to the 'trepidations of t h e  balance.' If a law is passed by a una- 
nimous legislature, clamored for  by the general voice of the public, 
and a cause is before him on i t  in which the whole community is on 
one side and an individual nameless or odious on the other, and he 
believes i t  to be against the  Constitution, he must so declare it, or 
there is no judge. If Athens comes there to demand tha t  the cup of 
hemlock be put to the lips of the wisest of men, and he believes that  
he has not corrupted the youth, nor omitted to  worship the gods of 
the city, nor introduced new divinities of his own, he must deliver 
him, though the thunder light on the  unterrified brow." 
Coleridge says, "Strength may be met with strength: the power 
of inflicting pain may be baffed by the pride of endurance: the eye 
of rage may be answered by the stare of defiance, or the downcast 
look of dark and revengeful resolve: and with all this there is  an  
outward and determined object to which the mind can attach its pas- 
sions and purposes, and bury its own disquietudes in the full occupa- 
tion of the senses. But who dares struggle with an  invisible com- 
batant, with an enemy which exists and makes us know its existence, 
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but where i t  is we ask in vain? No space contains it, time promises 
no control over it, i t  has no ear for my threats, i t  has no substance 
that my hands can grasp or my weapons find vulnerable; i t  commands 
and cannot be commanded, i t  acts and is insusceptible of my reaction, 
the more I strive to subje it, the more am I compelled to think of it, 
and, the more I think of it, the more do I find i t  to possess a reality 
out of myself, and not to be a phantom of my own imagination;- 
that all but the most abandoned men acknowledge its authority, and 
that the whole strength and majesty of my country are pledged to 
support i t ;  and yet that for me its power is the same with that of my 
own permanent self, and that all the choice which is permitted to me 
consists in having i t  for my guardian angel or my avenging fiend. 
This is the spirit of LAW,-the lute of Amphion,-the harp of 
Orpheus. This is the true necessity which compels man into the 
social state, now and always, by a still beginning, never ceasing, force 
of moral cohesion." 
If there be on earth a people who think less of justice and liberty 
than the laborer does of his harvest, or the workman of his daily 
bread, or the merchant of his wealth, or the mariner of his repose, 
or the soldier of his glory :-build around that people a high wall, 
that their breath may not infect the rest of the world. 
And that  people who are rising above mere material good, have 
placed their affections on the true good; who, to obtain that true 
good, have spared no labor, no fatigue, no sacrifice, shall hear this 
word: "For those who have a soul, there is the recompense of souls. 
Because thou hast loved justice and liberty before all things, come 
and possess forever liberty and justice."-From Words of a Believer. 
Our Constitution in the preamble provides that i t  is established 
"To perpetuate the principles of free government, to insure justice 
to all, promote the interest and happiness of the citizen and transmit 
to posterity the enjoyment of liberty." To this end laws are framed 
and the courts are provided to enforce the laws. The criminal who 
violates the laws is an enemy of government; he defies i t  for his 
personal and selfish aims. The courts are all the protection tlie peo- 
ple have and it  is true patriotism for the citizen to sustain them with 
all his help. A small portion of the population is ever in the criminal 
courts-less than one per cent. The people must depend upon the 
courts for personal liberty, personal security and the protection of 
private property. Courts should maintain the confidence of the peo- 
ple by carrying out the spirit of the laws. I t  does not help to criti- 
cise them unjustly, to hold them in disrespect and disparage their 
efforts to carry their burden. The greatest boon to all is liberty 
for which the people must depend upon the laws. The Supreme Court 
of the United States in 262 U. S. 390 in the case of Meyer vs. Nebraska 
said : 
"The liberty of all persons without doubt denotes not merely 
freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual 
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to 
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own con- 
science and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as  essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
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freemen." 
The Constitution guarantees all of these fundamental rights. 
They have been vindicated in many decided cases  It is  not strange 
that criminal laws should be broken. This was expected when they 
were passed; otherwise there would have been no provision for  pun- 
ishment. There has never been a law that  has not been violated, nor 
a statute but by some i t  was disregarded. This is t rue  of the "Thou 
shalt nots" of the Decalogue tha t  was given to  us by the Great Je- 
hovah; some people act as  if these were negligible and not binding. 
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Home Rule for Home Affairs 
(Advocating a Constitutional limitation on the Legislative 
power to interfere in the municipal control of matters of 
local concern). 
(Joseph M. Jones-A. B. Univ. of Ga.; L1. B., Harvard.) 
In taking up a matter of such vital importance to the welfare of 
the American municipalities, i t  is not amiss to delve, somewhat brief- 
ly, into the historical development of the alleged Home Rule doctrine. 
At a general rule, the citizens of our country are wont to justify their 
fundamental and almost inherent rights of local self government, re- 
ligious freedom, and personal equality on vague generalities, as were 
outlined in the Magna Charta, and successive Bills of Rights, with 
which our ancestors were so fervently imbued when they first  reach- 
ed these shores. 
This is all very well, but i t  seems much more desirable to have 
the whole matter settled once and for all, in so fa r  as  i t  can be settled 
without court action, by inserting a clause in the State Constitution 
expressly providing for a t  least a limited local self-government for 
the municipalities, in matters of local concern. But this argument 
runs counter to the time-worn, over-emphasized idea that the Legis- 
lature can exercise a free hand in the regulation and control of the 
municipalities, since the latter are only created arms of the State. 
I i t  is  often said with laconic emphasis, that the "Legislature is all- 
powerful-the Legislature created the municipal corporation and can 
destroy it, so the Legislature must have the absolute control, and if 
i t  wishes to exercise such control i t  may do so, unhampered by any 
court action." But in dissolving a Municipal Corporation the Legis- 
lature is limited by Constitutional provisions, prohibiting the impair- 
ment of contracts and the deprivation of property without due pro- 
cess of law. Then why can we not say that the Legislative power 
of control over Municipal Corporations is subject to, and limited by, 
the. Constitutional privilege of local self government in affairs having 
no direct relation to outsiders or outside activities. But, since there 
is great uncertainty as to whether the courts will recognize this Con- 
stitutional privilege as  being an inherent right in the American peo- 
ple (though some half dozen states have so recognized i t ) ,  i t  is high- 
ly desirable to so amend the State Constitution as  to insure protec- 
tion from arbitrary interference on the part of the Legislature. In 
advocating such a Constitutional limitation we must determine- (I) ,  
if such is in keeping with the historical development of the Municipal 
Corporation; ( 2 ) ,  if there is a logical basis for such a distinction; and 
(3),  if such action can be justified from a legal viewpoint. 
First as  to the historical development: When our ancestors first  
came to settle this country, they brought with them ideas of liberty 
and polity, and left a t  home all the undesirable and oppressing prin- 
ciples of the Royal Government. On reaching these wild and unde- 
veloped regions they found a field of unexampled extent, for the free 
development of such ideas. Accordingly, the system of intrusting the 
direction of local affairs to local constituencies has from the earliest 
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colonial periods, been developed by us to a much greater extent than 
in England. As you pass from one section of this country to  the oth- 
er, alike in the older regions a s  in the newest organized settlements, 
you find the affairs of each road district, school district, county or 
town, locally self managed, including the administration of Justice. 
Every county has a local court with full power to  summons a jury of 
the vicinity, thereby bringing Justice home to the business and bosoms 
of the people, and making i t  their own affair. 
Each State binds together the local institutions which i t  creates 
and regulates, independently of Federal control; thus happily pre- 
venting an undue concentration of the power and duty of regulating 
the affairs of the local communities, throughout a country of such ex- 
tent that with i ts  needs and interests i t  would be impossible for  Con- 
gress to become adequately acquainted. The number and general 
freedom of the Municipal Corporations invested with power t o  decide 
and control local and subordinate matters, pertaining solely to their 
respective communities, constitutes a marked feature in our system 
of Government They a re  simply the administrative form of the 
fundamental idea of American Government, viz, that  the people a re  
the source of all political powers, and have the right to exercise them. 
When our forefathers left their homes to brave the storms and 
ravages of this country, they came with definite notions of freedom, 
both in home and public life. They brought with them the forms of 
local organization, involving the right to local self government, and 
dating back to the time of the Saxon who invaded England, divided 
the country into civil divisions, and instilled in the people their f i rs t  
principles of civic patriotism. 
The Constitutions of the States were adopted a t  a time when this 
form of local self government was uniformly recognized, and i t  can 
be argued with considerable force, that  in a s  much a s  this right was 
recognized as being vested in, exercised and enjoyed by, the people of 
the respective communities, i t  remained in them unless expressly yield- 
ed up and granted to one of the departments of the State by the 
terms of the Constitution. (This argument is chiefly emphasized by 
those few theorists who claim that  the State Constitution, like the 
Federal, is to be regarded as  a mere grant  of powers by the people, 
who still remain all-powerful except where expressly placed under 
Legislative control). With this argument in mind, the courts of 
Michigan, Indiana and Kentucky, have held that  the people have an  
inherent right to local self-government in regard to matters of local 
concern, and have read such ideas into the  Constitutions. It seems 
more desirable, however, and a t  least more certain, to  follow the not- 
able example of New York, in assuring such right to the  people by a 
constitutional amendment, which expressly provides tha t  every muni- 
cipal officer, whose election or appointment is not provided fo r  in 
the Constitution, shall be elected by the Electors of the Municipality, 
or of some division there of. This is  only a modified form of Home 
Rule. Most of the Constitutional provisions go the full length and 
allow local self-government in all matters of purely local concern. 
Then i t  seems clear tha t  the adoption of such an  amendment to  
the Constitution is in keeping with the historical development of the 
hiunicipality-in fact some of our states have recognized the doctrine 
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without any express Constitutional provision. 
Second, as  to whether there is a logical and common sense basis 
to such action in distinguishing between matters of local and of pub- 
lic concern in this connection: Before trying to answer such a ques- 
tion, we should f i rs t  closely examine the whole subject to determine 
if possible, where and how this distinction is  to be made-where the 
dividing line is to be drawn, and what activities are to be classed as 
public and what as local. The uncertainty of results, based on the 
mass of inconsistent decisions, force us to leave the court as the final 
oracle of wisdom, except for a few outstanding activities. We might 
say that the powers of the Municipality, which relate to  the health, 
good government, and efficient police, in which all citizens have an 
equal interest, are of public concern. While those which directly in- 
volve the expenditure of money, and especially those relating to the 
various local improvements, the expense of which ultimately falls on 
the local property owners, are to be regarded as of purely local con- 
cern, and in respect to these the controlling voice ought to  be with 
those who must bear the burden. This seems to be logical enough; 
in fact i t  would seem wholly inconsistent with the fundamental ideals 
of American Government to hold otherwise. Our forefathers rose in 
arms when the mother country tried to impose burdens on them 
when they had no control over the assessment of such burdens. Why 
should the people in a remote part of the State be allowed, through 
their Representatives in the Legislature, to assess owners of distant 
city property large sums of money to help pay for a Municipal Park? 
Why should the political party in control of Legislature be allowed 
to send their supporter down to  control the water plant of a city in 
which the said supporter was wholly disinterested, save to fill his 
purse with the city's money? 
No Municipal Management will, in  the long run, be other than 
extravagant and unwise, where members of the Governing body have 
no substantial interests in the welfare of the community, and where 
they have more to gain by plundering than protecting it. To insure 
good Government there must be a real identity of interest between 
the members of the Governing Board and the Community. A system 
of popular municipal organization and local administration is un- 
doubtedly the fairest to the individual citizen. Any other conclusion 
would be equivalent to an admission that the people in this country 
are incapable of enlightened self-government, in regard to matters 
of local concern, and that the few ought to govern the many. Thus 
i t  seems that this doctrine of local self-government in regard to mat- 
ters of local concern, is not only logical in its distinction, but reason- 
ably justified on grounds of fairness and expediency. Then since 
local matters can better be regulated by the people of the locality 
than by the central powers, we should provide in our Constitutions 
that each city shall, as to its local matters, be self-governing. Not 
only is the doctrine of local self-government wholly logical and fair, 
but to deny i t  seems dangerous to the stability of our political in- 
stituions. 
Under color of Legislative control, politicians, Legislators ig- 
norant of Constitutional law, if no worse is to be said of them, and 
Judges accepting the doctrine without adequate study of the history 
HOME RULE FOR HOME AFFAIRS 27 
and development of the American Colonies, are  unconsciously cooper- 
ating to deprive our towns and cities of their right to self-govern- 
ment in their local affairs. 
It  is further to be noted that  Legislators are  prompted to inter- 
fere with local self-government as  a general rule, only when the dom- 
inating political machinery of their party is losing its control in the 
particular city sought thus to be brought into subjection. Legisla- 
ture always purports to be acting in the interest of sound morality, 
on the ground that the inhabitants have shown themselves incompet- 
ent to manage their own affairs;  but this system of paternalism, of 
government by an outside body, which was the essence of the Roman 
system of governing the colonies by Prefects, always works to the in- 
jury of the community. 
The case of State v. Smith, 44 Ohio St. 348, might be given a t  
this point, as a notable example of the attitude of the courts on this 
matter. The members of the local Boards, under the Act there in 
question, were to be appointed by the Governor, though the duties of 
the officers were clearly local, i. e., "to supervise the cleaning and im- 
proving of the streets, wharves, markets, and the sewers of the city." 
Each officer way to receive $4,000 a year, a rather high price in those 
days, certainly high enough to  make the Act a desirable one for  the 
party in power, that  i t  might have some nice f a t  "plums", with which 
to reward its henchmen, f ree  from control by the local community. 
Owen, C. J., in a vigorous dissent a t  page 382, characterizes the Act 
as "a scheme of conspiracy and fraud, unparallelled in the history of 
the Legislature." Even i n  the opinion of the Majority of the Court 
admitted the character of the Act when i t  said, a t  page 374: "Over 
the wisdom or policy of this Legislature this court has no control," 
citing the language used in Sharpless V. Mayor, 21 Pa. St. 162: "There 
is no shadow of reason for  the supposition that  the mere abuse of 
power was meant to be corrected by the Judiciary. The remedy in 
such cases is with the people." 
As to the Georgia law on this point, the case of Mayor of Ameri- 
cus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871 seems to  be outstanding, where Judge Cobb 
laid down the rule that, "There is  nothing in the Constitution of this 
state which guarantees to the people living within the limits of a 
municipal corporation the absolute right of local self-government. 
How far  people so situated may be allowed to participate in the choice 
of officers who are to administer the affairs of the local government 
is a matter exclusively within the judgment and discretion of the Gen- 
eral Assembly. The power to appoint public officers is  not purely an  
executive function, but this power may be exercised by the General 
Assembly, when not otherwise provided in the constitution, either by 
naming a given person for  the office, o r  providing the manner in 
which the officer shall be chosen; and the General Assembly also has 
the authority to provide for  the appointment of a number of officers 
to discharge a given duty, and provide that  vacancies in such number 
may be filled by those remaining in office, thus creating a self-per- 
petuating body." 
In the early case of Churchill v. Walker, 68 Ga. 681, Judge Speer 
held an Act of the Legislature constitutional, where i t  subjected the 
town of Darien to the control of the commissioners of the county in 
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which i t  was situated, merely stating that "All acts of the legislature 
are presumably valid and constitutional, and this is conclusive unless 
i t  can be shown that the act is prohibited by the constitution." 
Thus i t  seems that the courts of this state have reluctantly upheld 
such interferences, leaving i t  to the people to remedy the situation 
by a constitutional amendment. 
Then, if the courts are to be so technical in their decisions, and 
so strict in their interpretation of the Constitution, i t  is for the 
people to step forward and demand an Amendment to the Constitu- 
tion, expressly limiting this arbitrary power of the Legislature. 
The fact that the Municipal Corporation is liable for its Torts, 
committed in the exercise of the private or business functions, seems 
to furnish another logical basis for distinguishing between matters 
of public and of local concern, though the terms private and local are 
not entirely synonymous. If a Municipal Corporation is to be held 
liable for the negligent acts of the Water Plant Commissioner or the 
Wharf Commissioner, then i t  seems only fair that i t  should be allow- 
ed the exclusive privilege of selecting such agents. Of course, if the 
city, acting in its capacity a s  an arm of the State, enjoys the privi- 
lege and immunities of the State as  in police powers, then i t  is only 
natural for the State to assert control over such officers. In  the for- 
mer case the city seems to  be acting just like a private corporation, 
or private citizen and as  such, should be allowed to select i ts own 
agents and conduct its own business. In the latter case the city i u  
not a real corporation a t  all, but only a subordinate branch or unit 
of the State itself. So, in its Governmental or public character, the 
Municipal Corporation is made by the State, one of its instrumentali- 
ties. It is  the local depository of State Government and i t  pre- 
scribes the political powers to be exercised for the public good and on 
behalf of the State rather than for itself. As such the Municipal 
Corporation is only a part of the governing machinery of the Sover- 
eign State which creates it, and in this respect the Legislature ia 
aupreme. 
Hut in its proprietary or private character, the powers are con- 
cerned not so much with considerations connected with the Govern- 
ment of the State a t  Large, but with the private advantage of the 
compact community, which is incorporated as  a distinct legal person, 
or corporate individual. As to such powers and property, and con- 
tracts made in reference thereto, the corporation is to be regarded, 
quo ad hoc, as a private corporation. Then, the limitations on the 
Legislative power over the property and contracts rights of a private 
corporation throw light upon like questions as respects the municipal 
corporation. As to private corporations, the Legislature has no power 
of control, other than to dissolve them-it cannot impair or affect 
the property or contract rights of the corporation, but can only control 
i ts right to exist. On this analogy, the Legislature, though i t  pos- 
sesses full power to dissolve the municipal corporation, cannot deprive 
i t  (or rather the people of the locality a t  whose expense i t  has been 
acquired or for whose benefit i t  was granted) of such property. 
Third, as  to the question whether such action, in adopting a con- 
stitutional amendment securing local self-government, can be justi- 
fied from a legal point of view, let us first  see if the Federal Consti- 
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tution forbids such action. Municipal affairs, being inherently local 
in  their origin and nature, a re  clearly left to the respective states by 
the Federal Constitution. It is  inconceivable that  the Federal gov- 
crnment should t ry  to control the local affairs of the municipalities 
scattered throughout this large country. So, municipal law is gen- 
?rally regarded as  a matter to be determined and controlled by the 
state acts and decisions, and if such a case gets to the Federal courts, 
the state law will govern unless i t  violates rights guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution, such as  the deprivation of property without due 
process of law or the inpairment of contracts. There is  nothing in 
the Federal Co~stitution to prevent the state from giving, if i t  sees 
fit, by constitutional amendment, full jurisdiction of this matter to 
the courts, thereby taking the control a s  to details entirely away 
from the Legislature. In  fact, perhaps fully one-half of the  state 
constitutions now have provisions forbidding legislative regulation of 
internal affairs in the municipalities, and a number of other states 
have forbidden Legislature to appoint local officers. 
Though such a constitutional amendment is more certain, the 
same desirable results have sometimes been reached by court action 
showing further that such an amendment is justified from a legal 
point of view. A New York court, in 67 N. E. 129, held unconstitu- 
tional an Act of the New York Legislature prohibiting anyone who 
contracted with state or municipal authorities from requiring more 
than 8 hours of labor a day. Ordinarily, when Legislature regulates 
1:ibor contracts, i t  only exercises a right to prescribe the terms of 
contracts made by its agents ( in  connection with roads, bridges, and 
such matters of public concern). But local concerns, a s  municipal 
buildings, adornment of streets, and improvement of city parks can- 
not be thus controlled by the state. The weakness of the New York 
Act lies in the breadth of the language which includes contracts made 
in connection with all sorts of municipal works, local a s  well a s  public. 
On studying the past history of France, Germany and Russia, 
one seems justified in drawing the conclusion tha t  no country can 
live after destroying local self-government. The weak spot in our 
system is the exaltation of state rights a t  the expense of town rights 
and local home rule. The relation of the states to the Federal gov- 
cmment is all right but the relation between the states and towns is  
:ill wrong, if the views of some courts a re  to prevail. It is the denial 
of this fundemantal right of local self-government tha t  forces cities 
to pay large salaries to officers appointed by the state, who a re  
under no responsibility to the city whose affairs they manage and 
whose money they disburse. To remedy this, the principle should be 
rstablished that the authority that  pays shall appoint and control in 
all local matters. To help in restoring a better state of things, every 
new Constitution should, in i ts  bill of rights, recognise local self-gov- 
ernment along with religious freedom and personal equality. It 
should state expressly the right of Legislature to pass laws only on 
application of the particular municipality affected, and even then sub- 
ject to ratification by its own voters. If no new constitution is being 
adopted, the provision securing local self-government can be set forth 
in an amendment. 
The foregoing argument is  based on the solid and rational foun- 
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dation that the control of local affairs and consequential responsibili- 
ties should be vested in those who are  directly interested and who will 
reap the advantages of care and good management, or suffer the con- 
sequences of neglect and mismanagement. Local self-government will 
create and cultivate in the citizen a feeling of civic patriotism, and 
where civic virtues exist the local community will neither suffer from 
public indifference and neglect, nor become tainted with political 
"graft" or corruption. 
Good government in local affairs is the best assurance of good 
government in state and national affairs. Judging from the experi- 
ence of the states adopting the principles herein advocated, the result 
will work for  the betterment of not only the municipality affected but 
the state and nation as  well. Under this doctrine, municipal misrule 
and neglect cannot go beyond a certain limit. On the other hand, 
the author is confident that  there is in every municipality in this 
land civic virtue enough, whenever called into activity, to secure a well- 
ordered and honest municipal home rule. 
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This address was delivered by Julius M. Mayer of New York 
who was a United States Circuit Judge of the  Court of Appeals fo r  
the Second Circuit. It was delivered before the  Alumni of t h e  Co- 
lumbia Law School. Judge Mayer has  since died, but  previous to  
his death he sent the  manuscript of i t  to  Judge Gober with permis- 
sion to print i t  in the  Foreword of Gober's Georgia Evidence, and 
by permission of Judge Gober i t  i s  printed here. 
The Lawyer and the Judge 
Lawyers and judges a r e  human beings. They have good days 
and bad days, pleasant moods and disagreeable moods. There a r e  
times when they a re  a t  their  best and times when they a r e  a t  their  
worst. 
But, in the main, subject equally to  human frailty, the  lawyer 
and the judge strive honorably and earnestly to do their  duty to 
the trust they have assumed. Tha t  trust ,  in  the  case of the  lawyer, 
is something more than the endeavor to  a t ta in  the  resul t  desired by 
his client. I t  comprehends the  obligations so to act  a s  to contribute 
to the dignity of the administration of justice and to the  respect 
in which the law shall be held in  t h e  community a t  large. Tha t  
trust, in the case of the judge, involves not merely the aspiration 
to render a just decision but the  obligation to  give all  who have the 
right to be heard an  attentive hearing and so to  conduct himself 
as to inspire confidence in the  earnest character of his endeavor 
and the mental integrity of his decisions, whether they be regarded 
as correct or not. 
In this common effort, each in his own way, to  do his duty, the  
lawyer and the judge must cooperate in the  work-a-day tasks each 
ia called upon to  undertake. 
The lawyer is  entitled to the  best there  is  in the  judge. The 
least to which he and his cause a re  entitled i s  a judge aler t  and not 
morn, interested and not indifferent, appreciative of the  seriousness 
of the cause to those concerned and not scornful because the  con- 
troversy may seem petty in comparison with other causes. 
The judge is entitled to  the  best there  is  in the  lawyer. The 
least to which the judge is entitled from the lawyer is conscientious 
preparation, perfect frankness, good manners and relief f rom un- 
necessary labors. 
To accomplish any result of consequence, many small steps a r e  
necessary. The artistic figure of justice standing on the eminence 
of a fine temple would not have its place but fo r  the infinite toil 
with instruments in themselves not beautiful, which laid the  foun- 
dation and built the superstructure upon which the figure ultimate- 
ly rests. 
To speak, then, of small things is  not a descent to  the  petty, 
if as a result, the lawyer will better understand the  judge and thus  
make easier the daily task of each. 
There is probably no responsible court, Federal o r  State, f i r s t  
instance or appellate, which i s  not working under great  pressure. 
Litigations arising out of o r  a s  a result  of the  war, the  increase of 
statute law, civil and criminal, national and state, the  creation and 
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development of new kinds of industries and businesses, the unceas- 
ing complexity of economic problems giving rise to questions of 
constitutional and commercial law in  foreign and domestic commerce 
have all combined to place a heavy burden on the courts. 
Many courts, a t  the moment, are  in  serious need of more judges 
and the  time of judges should not be encroached upon uselessly or  
carelessly. A few- cases in  every court can wait fo r  decision and 
delay will not work injury but  most cases should be decided prompt- 
ly and the judge in the  court of f i r s t  instance should have the op- 
portunity of giving them fa i r  consideration; for  not infrequently 
his decision ends the litigation. I n  order, however, physically to 
read the papers in law suits not to speak of examining authorities 
and writing opinions and memoranda much time must be occupied. 
Thus, verbose affidavits, or other papers which drag in  extran- 
eous matter or substitute argument for a simple statement of the 
essential facts  a re  undue and unfair drafts upon his time. They 
accomplish nothing; for  the experienced judge readily sees through 
them. Inadequate o r  inaccurate references to  the testimoney and 
lack of reference are  annoyances which add to  the physical labor 
of the  judge from which he should have been spared and the time 
spent by him in searching for  or  checking up the testimony, to which 
he  might easily have been referred, might be spent much more 
profitably. 
It i s  surprising, also, how extensively the word "brief" has  be- 
come a nisnomer. This i s  partly due to lack of courage and partly 
to lack of careful preparation. 
The law, in most instances, is  plastic. The lawyer studies and 
makes his points. He is the one who moulds and initiates. To him, 
i s  often due the credit of a sound or  a n  able judicial decision be- 
cause he  has  pointed the way. 
I f  he has  not the  courage to emphasize the outstanding points 
of the  case and fills his brief with minor catchalls, he will not in- 
frequently lose the advantage which his opponent gains by driving 
home to the mind of the busy trial  judge the major propositions anti 
letting the driftwood go. 
Nothing is  more important in  a brief either in  the court below 
or  in  a n  appellate court than a n  accurate, orderly and clear state- 
ment of the facts  and, nothing i s  more important than a succinct 
presentation of the facts  with a knowledge so complete tha t  counsel 
can readily tu rn  to the record to substantiate any testimony ques- 
tioned or  drawn into argument. 
So. too, with the citation of cases. Resort to  encyclopedias of 
law and the citation of a great  mass of cases therein cited is the 
lazy man's way of briefing so called. The lawyer who aids th -  
courts and soon becomes known as  able and reliable is  he  who h 
the courage and discernment to make selection and one case in  poi 
i s  a s  good for  the  purpose of convincing the court a s  a hundred. 
,A,= 
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If a case closely in  point cannot be found, then, ordinarily, it 
i s  sufficient to  state the  principle with reference to a recognized 
writer such a s  Cooley, for  instance, and a limited number of cases 
which though distinguishable, may show the trend of judicial 
thought. 
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The lawyer, who has  not the courage of selection and depends 
wholly on the judge in a court of f i rs t  instance, forgets tha t  the 
judge rarely has time to  make a s  thorough an  independent investi- 
ation as he would wish and must depend largely on the assistance 
lf counsel. 
But the poor brief or the  feeble argument is  due most usually 
L O  lack of preparation. That  lack is obviously unjust to the  client 
and unfair to the court. The long and, sometimes, dreary hours 
spent by men in their early days a t  the bar in  the  thorough prepara- 
tion of the simplest cases a r e  often the foundation of a n  able and 
seasoned career. No quotation should appear in  a brief unless its 
writer has examined the case from which the quotation is  extracted 
and nothing is  more annoying to  courts tha t  quotations isolated 
from context where a reading of the case shows tha t  i t  i s  not in 
point either on principle or authority and tha t  the quotation waB 
an expression of the court in  another connection. In  brief making, 
also, where the construction of statutes, ordinances or  regulations 
made in pursuance of law a r e  under discussion. i t  i s  a convenient 
aid to the rourt, to incorporate the  statute in  the brief on in  an  ap-  
pendix thereto. 
In briefs as  well a s  in oral argument, i t  is well to  be frank and 
concede a point which cannot be sustained. An equivocal answer to 
rhe court, accomplishes nothing. It suggests weakness and lack 
of confidence and no advocate is  so strong a s  he who believes in  his 
case and shows i t  by his earnestness and his enthusiasm. 
In describing events o r  things, simple illustrations a re  often 
useful. I t  must be remembered tha t  the court is  hearing about 
the subject matter for  the f i rs t  time, while counsel, presumably, 
have lived with the case. The nature and action of complicated 
machinery in, for  instance, a tor t  case can be much simplified in  
illustration by eliminating technical terms and resorting to terms 
familiar to the lay mind. I recall the  able presentation of a well 
known patent lawyer in opening a very diffuclt case when referring 
to a certain electrical instrumentality he said tha t  this  man was the 
"Tight wad" who had his eye on the other instrumentality who was 
the "spendthrjft". He vitalized these electrical instruments and 
forces into human beings and, of course, what he meant was tha t  
while one instrument expended electricity unduly, the other checked 
it. That illustration though, perhaps, inelegant, a t  once explained 
the  action under discussion and remained in  the memory of the judge 
long after many technical details had been forgotten. The strength 
of the so-called country lawyer lies in  his ability to make his point 
with homely illustrations, drawn from his knowledge of the  animal 
kingdom and the products of the field. He is keen in his knowledge 
of human nature and he rarely takes the wisdom of the judge for  
granted. 
-- 
Not the least important acquisition of a lawyer i s  a well modu- 
lated voice. I t  would be idle to deny t ha t  even the healthiest; 
judges, physically speaking, may show weariness a s  the day grows 
long, especially if they conscientiously concentrate on the argument 
or trial in progress. The raucous voice is  wearing and the shout- 
ing voice almost unberable. The lawyer thus afflicted is prab- 
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ably unconscious of the difficulty but no better service can be done 
by his friends than frankly to suggest to him to t ry  to cultivate his 
voice. 
I am not speaking tonight of jury trials. Advocacy in that 
branch is  an a r t  by itself. But, the oratory of passion and of ges- 
ture is  no longer necessary in addressing judges. 
Then, there are some other tribulations of a judge, which may 
seem trifling, but are  time takers and irritants. The submission 
of proposed conflicting orders upon notice of settlement where the 
differences could readily be adjusted by fa i r  minded counsel but 
where failure to agree requires tha t  the judge should wearily check 
up the differences, if he confines his labors to the papers or listens 
to arguments as  to the details, if he is willing to hear an  oral pres- 
entation. So, also, in the preparation of records on appeal, where 
weeks or months after the trial, the judge is expected to  remember 
whether the witness testified that he did or did not see the de- 
fendant on Wednesday, the 3rd of April, and counsel are in controversy 
as to an error in the stenographer's minutes or where, 
in the Federal Courts, counsel are unable to agree upon a 
bill of exceptions a t  law or a record on appeal in equity (and doubt- 
less the same prevails in the State courts), when the exercise of 
some patience and of a spirit of cooperation would result in an 
agreement between counsel and thus a saving of time, which the 
judge might more profitably employ. 
In brief, the duty which the lawyer owes the judge is to agree 
with his adversary to the fullest extent not inconsistent with the 
protection of the rights of his client in respect of the detail and ma- 
chinery attendant upon the average law suit. 
Leaving now these considerations which may be regarded as 
minor, a word or two may be said in  respect of the more important 
relations which the lawyer bears to the court and which a t  the 
same time involve the dignity of the profession. 
Codes of ethics are, of course, of great value a s  expressing the 
contemporaneous conception of the lawyer's duty, but codes of eth- 
ics do not always induce conduct in conformity with their rules 
or principles. 
Besides, there are certain rights which a lawyer has in respect 
of public discussion which i t  would be unwise to endeavor to  re- 
strain, even if there were power so to do, and I doubt such power. 
The lines between the discipline to which the bar may be subjected 
and the right of free speech is very delicate and should not be med- 
dled with. Yet, in the last analysis, the strong deterrent is the de- 
sire for  good repute; for  few lawyers are indifferent to  the favor- 
able opinion of their brethcen a t  the bar and of their brethren on 
the bench. The lawyer and the judge rarely need any formula to 
tell them what conduct is  consonant with the dignity of the pro- 
fession. 
The tendency to conduct a private litigation through the agency 
of press publicity seems to be growing instead of diminishing. The 
newspaper reporter and publisher are  not to be blamed. The lawyer 
is  furnishing them with the commodity known a s  news. I t  is, of 
course, very difficult to see what the lawyer gains by this plan of 
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rsrlmpaign. If he thinks he may intimidate someone whom he sup- 
poses to be a weak judge, he may miss his guess and find tha t  he is 
brfore a strong judge. If he thinks that  he may influence a jury 
about to be drawn, he may find t ha t  the twelve men ultimately 
chosen never head of the case. Such a plan of publicity campaign 
tends to give laymen an  unpleasant impression of the law. They 
see only the picture of snarling, undignified lawyers trying their 
cases, as the expression goes, in the newspapers and thus misrepre- 
senting the profession and causing humiliation to those who re- 
spect and love the profession and consider i t  a privilege to  be par! 
of it. 
In respect of those lawyers who occupy public offices a s  legal 
:tdvisers to public bodies, i t  is, of course, frequently necessary that  
they keep the public informed in regard to matters effecting the 
public interest. This can be done in a manner entirely consistent 
with the announcement of a policy OF the giving of information ac- 
cording to the orderly and dignified usages of the profession. The 
extravagant predictions as  to  what will be accomplished in a par- 
ticular litigation, civil or criminal, frequently fail  to  come true. 
The result is that the public i s  led into doubt and confusion. The 
impression sometimes goes abroad tha t  somehow the law has broken 
down and that there is something wrong with judges and juries, 
when the truth is that  the lawyer in public office who made the 
dazzling promises as  to success never had a case t o  s tar t  with and 
yielded to the pressure of momentary public clamour or desire for  
notoriety instead of being faithful to the high purposes and tradi- 
tions of his profession. 
It is an interesting fact, as  may be checked up by the recollec- 
tions of events in any lawyer's lifetime, that  the lawyer who in pri- 
vate or public litigation departs from the ideals of the profession 
usually is the tiny craft  passing away in the night to oblivion. He 
may have a little temporary renown of a certain kind but long af ter  
he is forgotten, his professional brother who, day af ter  day, has  
done his work with an  eye single to  his duty to his client and the 
court is sooner or later appreciated and leaves behind hime, if not 
alwnys a great reputation, a t  least a respected reputation. 
I have been speaking about the lawyer. Let me say something 
about the judge. There are  some men whom the judicial life makes 
solitary, but unless a man i s  solitary by nature, i t  is well for  him 
that he should move among men. The courts a r e  dealing with 
great human affairs, questions of welfare and liberty, question3 
which reflect the problems of the commerce on land and sea and the 
relations of men to each other in every conceivable aspect. I t  is, 
in my view, of benefit to  a judge that  he should have social relations 
with the lawyer. That relation rubs off the rough edges. The law- 
yer discovers that the mysterious person called a judge i s  pretty 
much like anyone else. He has his little vanities, his particular opin- 
ions and generally he has the same desire for  agreeable companion- 
ship as anyone else. The Judge by social contact with the lawyer 
or the man of affairs learns of the new problems or if interesting 
variations of the old problems with which the worlds of finance and 
commerce are confronted and from conversation and discussion and 
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even gossip, the judge is  kept in touch with the affairs of the big 
outside world upon whose rights and relations he is daily adjucating. 
Courtesy and reasonable consideration for the lawyer are 
among the most important attributes of a judge. By this method 
he gains the cooperation of the lawyer and the lawyer is  disposed 
t o  be more frankly helpful than he would be, if he feels tha t  he must 
t reat  with the judge a t  arm's length. 
On the other hand, one must be a judge to  realize how import- 
an t  is the observance of rules of procedure and of court routine. 
At times, these rules seem harsh, yet so constant is  the requirement 
tha t  the court's business should be kept going that  compliance with 
rules is  not a matter of choice with the courts but of necessity. 
The respect in  which the court is held depends, of course, very 
largely upon the judge. He will have not much difficulty, if he 
will remember the simple terms of his oath of office. I wonder how 
many men know the phraseology of tha t  oath. To read it, carries 
its own comment and i t  reads: 
"I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to 
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faith- 
fully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on me 
according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Con- 
stitution and laws of the United States; and that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; 
that  I wiYl bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this abliga- 
tion freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that 
I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am 
about to enter. So help me God." 
I know of no finer statement of the position which a judge 
should take than that  expressed by an  eminent contemporary Amer- 
ican, recently appointed to the highest judicial office in the gif t  of 
his fellow countrymen. I doubt whether the letter to which I shall 
refer was wisely read. Under date of July 13, 1921, when Mr. Chief 
Justice Taft  announced that  he would cease to be a contributor to 
the editorial column of a newspaper, he wrote: 
"The degree in which a Judge should separate himself from general ac- 
tivities as a citizen and a mem,ber of the community is not usually fixed by 
statutory law, but by a due sense of propriety, considering the nature of his 
office, and by well-established custom. Certainly, in this country a t  least. 
a Judge should keep out of politics and out of any diversion or avocation 
which may involve him in politics. It is one of those characteristic queer 
inconsistencies in the British judicial system, which was the forerunner of our 
own, tha t  the highest judicial officer in Great Britiiln, the Lord Chancellor, 
is often very much in politics and has always been. He changes with each 
adminiatration, and his is a political appointment; but all the other Judges 
of the High Courts of England are a s  little in  politics as in this country. 
A Judge ohould avoid extra judicial activities, not only because they may 
put him in an attitude actually or seemingly inconsistent with absolute im- 
partiality in the discharge of his judicial duties but also because he owea 
hlis whole time and energy to his judicial work." 
If then, the lawyer and the judge shall conscientiously attempt 
-to do their work along the ideals of the great and responsible pro- 
fession to which they belong in common, each will have done his 
duty and, in the long run, i t  makes small difference what fame each 
may or may not attain. 
In the history of the world, in the development and administra- 
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tion of governments, the lawyer and the judge have played no small 
part. They have borne their full share and responsibility in safe- 
warding life and liberty and promoting the pursuit of happiness. 
That responsibility is, if anything, greater today than before, when 
new problems are facing the world in every corner. It is for men 
like ourselves, graduates of a great institution, who have had the 
privilege of sitting under great teachers and learned men to contri- 
bute our share in our humble way to the performance of the t rue 
duties of the lawyer and the judge and to safeguard the repute of 
the profession. Our relations must be those of mutual respect and 
of mutual regard to  which we shall be entitled only if we earn that  
right, and, in the future a s  in the past, the lawyer and the  judge 
shall walk along the corridors of time, arm in arm, in the common 
aspiration to be true ministers of justice. 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 
Andrew J. Cobb, The Supreme 
Court Judge 
- 
(BY A. W. COZA~T)  
Opinions written by Judge Cobb appear in the Georgia Reports 
from 100 Georgia to 128 Georgia., both inclusive. His first opinion 
appears in the case of Behere v. National Cash Register Company, 
100 G. 213, and his last opinion appears in the case of Sapp v. Will- 
iamson, 128 Ga. 743, filed July 13, 1907, but on the same date he 
filed opinions in two other cases, to-wit: Hodges v. Stuart Lumber 
Company, 128 Ga. 733; Rountree v. Gaulden, 128 Ga. 737. His rea- 
ignation took effect from October, 12, 1907. 
An examination of our reports has led me to the following con- 
clusions, which I believe to be correct: 
1. No other Appellate Court judge in Georgia has ever render- 
ed a s  many opinions in cases simplifying and systematizing ques- 
tions of pleading and practice. 
See the following cases; Kelly v. Strouse & Bros. 116 Ga. 872; 
Toole v. Edmondson & Seay Bros., 104 Ga. 776; Glover v. State, 128 
Ga. 1 ;  Watson v. State, 116 Ga. 607. 
2. He rendered opinions in more cases which have been cited 
more times, within the same length of time, than did any other 
Georgia Appellate Court Judge. 
See the following twelve cases; 
Name of case. No. of times cited. 
............................. ............................. 
Supreme Court. Court of App. Total 
Toole vs. Edmondson & Seay 
Bros., 104 Ga. 776 15 23 38 
City of Dawson v. Dawson 
Water Works Co., 106 Ga. 696 40 8 48 
Mitchell v. Ga. & Afa. Rwy. 
Co., 111 Ga. 760. 24 17 41 
Forsyth Mfg. Co., v. Castlen, 
112 Ga. 199. 26 26 52 
W. &. A. RR. Co. v. Ferguson, 
113 Ga. 708. 19 2 1 40 
Welborn v. State, 
114 Ga. 793. 36 17 63 
Kelly v. Strouse & Bros., 
116 Ga. 872. 46 49 94 
Langley v. City Council of Au- 
guesta, 118 Ga. 590. 13 2 1 34 
Cawthon v. State, 
119 Ga. 395. 26 11 36 
Moore v. Dublin Cotton Milla, 
127 Ga. 609. S 26 28 
Moultrie Repair Co. v. Hill, 
120 Ga. 730. 10 21 31 
Rawlings v. State, 
124 Ga. 31. 14 20 34 
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3. He rendered the opinion in a case which has been cited 
more times than any other case decided by a Georgia Appellate 
Court, the one in the Kelly case-cited 94 times. 
Chief Justice Logan E. Bleckley's greatest opinion, according 
to his own judgment, was written in the Ellison case, 87 Ga. 691, and 
this case has been cited by the Supreme Court 44 times and by the 
Court of Appeals 23 times-total 67. 
Mr. Justice William A. Little's greatest opinion was written in 
the Powell case, 101 Ga. 9, which has been cited by the Supreme 
Court 45 times, and by the Court of Appeals 20 times-total 65. 
One of Mr. Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin's greatest opinions 
waB written in the Lyndon case, 129 Ga. 353, which has been cited 
by the Supreme Court 26 times and by the Court of Appeals 47 times 
-total 73. 
One of Chief Justice Thomas J. Simmon's greatest opinions was 
written in the Anglin case, 120 Ga. 785, which has been cited by the 
Supreme Court 29 times and by the Court of Appeals 32 times-- 
total 61. 
4. Judge Cobb rendered opinions in many noted murder cases. 
The first of these was in the Ryder case, 100 Ga. 528, and the last 
was in the Glover case, 128 Ga. 1. The most famous murder case 
in which he wrote an opinion, I presume, was the Rawlings case, 
124 Ga. 31. 
6. He was to the Supreme Court of Georgia what Joseph Story 
was to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
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Georgia as a Litigant in the United 
States Supreme Court 
1. 
GEORGIA V. BRAILSFORD ET AL., 2 DALLAS 402 (1792); 
3 DALLAS 199 (1796.) 
Hampton L. Carson in "The History of the Supreme Court" says: 
"The first  cause of note was that of the State of Georgia v. Brailsford 
et al. In 1782, by an Act of Confiscation, a bond which had been 
given, in 1774, by Kelsall and Spalding to Brailsford and others, al- 
leged aliens, had been sequestrated to the State of Georgia, Brailsford 
and his co-partners had brought suit on the bond in 1791, in the 
United States Circuit Court for  the District of Georgia. The State 
had unsuccessfully applied for permission to assert her claim and 
judgment for the plaintiffs was rendered. The State now filed her 
bill in equity in the Supreme Court for an injunction to stay pro- 
ceedings in the lower Court, and praying that the Marshal should be 
directed to pay over the moneys in his hands to the treasurer of the 
State. A, motion was subsequently made to dissolve the injunctioll 
and dismiss the bill, but i t  was allowed to stand until the next term, 
but the right of the State was tried by a special jury, upon an amic- 
able issue, before the Supreme Court." 
The Court charged the jury, practically directing a verdict against 
Georgia. 
This was the f i rs t  case tried by a jury in the Supreme Court. 
Two other cases were tried by a jury in the Court. 
It is an interesting fact that the first  opinion which appears i n  
the Reports was a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Johnson, being 
in the case wherein Georgia was the plaintiff, reported in 2 Dallas 
402, supra. 
11. 
CHISHOLM V. GEORGIA, 2 DALLAS 419 (1793). 
Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina, brought a suit against 
the State of Georgia in the Supreme Court, and one of the questions 
was whether under the Constitution a citizen of one State could sue 
another State. Chief Justice Jay, writing the majority opinion of 
the Court, (which was the most important opinion he ever write) 
held that  the Court had jurisdiction. This decision brought about 
the Eleventh Amendment. The decision produced great excitement. 
The States were burdened with debts. Several States had been sued 
and Hampton L. Carson said in his great work above quoted: "The 
Legislature of Georgia responded by a statute denouncing the penalty 
of death against any one who should presume to enforce any process 
upon the judgment within its jurisdiction." 
Mr. Carson is in error in this statement. The House of Repre- 
sentatives of the General Assembly of Georgia passed such a bill but 
the Senate did not pass it, so f a r  as  the records show. Hon. Robert 
Alston, when he was President of the Bar Association of Georgia, in 
his President's Address, stated the true facts touching this matter. 
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111. 
FLETCHER V. PECK, 6 CRANCH 87 (1810). 
In "The Supreme Court of the United States," Hampton L. Car- 
son thus speaks of this case: "The case of Fletcher v. Peck will 
always be memorable as the f i rs t  case of that long line of instances 
in which the statutes of a State repugnant to the Constitution have 
been held to be void. I t  is the f i rs t  judicial determination of a consti- 
tutional restriction upon the powers of the States. I t  towers above 
the decisions of a period of many years, important and imposing 
though they are, and, with Marbury v. Madison, stands as  an outspur 
of that magnificent range of adjudication which bear to our constitu- 
tional jurisprudence the relative strength and majesty of the Rocky 
Xountains to our physical Geography. The State of Georgia had 
sought by Legislative enactment to destroy rights acquired under s 
previous statute of the same State, granting lands to an individual. 
It held that a grant was a contract executed, the obligation of whicn 
continued; and since the Constitution drew no distinction between 
contracts executed or executory, the Constitutional clause must be so 
interpreted as to comprehend both." 
This case grew out of the Georgia "Yazoo Fraud Acts," and while 
Georgia was not a party technically, she was vitally interested in 
the issue. 
IV. 
CHEROKEE NATION V. GEORGIA, 5 PETERS 1 (1831). 
A motion was made in the United States Supreme Court to re- 
utrain by injunction the execution of certain laws of Georgia, in the 
territory of the Cherokee Nation, the tribe claiming they had a right 
to proceed as a foreign State. Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the 
majority opinion of the Court, held that the tribe was not a foreign 
Nation and could not maintain the action, the Court not having juris- 
diction, and he further held that to maintain the action the Court 
would have to exercise political power which was not within the pro- 
vince of the judiciary. 
It is said that the opinion of Chancellor Kent, in favor of the 
jurisdiction, had been obtained by counsel, William Wirt and John 
Sergeant, before the bill was filed. 
v. 
WORCESTER V. GEORGIA, 6 PETERS 515 (1832). 
William Wirt and John Sergeant, who appeared for the Cherokee 
Nation in the Supreme Court, re-appeared as  Counsel for  Worcester 
in the above case, and Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion 
of the Court, held: "The Cherokee Nation is a distinct community, 
occupying its own territory with boundaries accurately described, in 
which the laws of Georgia can have no force*** The Act of the State 
of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in error was prosecuted, is, con- 
sequently void and the judgment a nullity." 
Georgia treated this judgment with defiance and Worcester was 
still kept in prison. President Jackson is reported to have said: 
"John Marshall has made the decision, now let him enforce it." How- 
ever, at the end of eighteen months Georgia relented and the prison- 
er was released. 
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VI. 
GEORGIA V. MADRAZZO, 1 PETERS 110; 7 PETERS 627. 
In  this case, it was held: "Admiralty process cannot issue when 
i t  i s  not a case where the property is not in custody of a Court of 
Admiralty, or brought within its jurisdiction, and in the possession of 
any private person." 
Georgia, therefore, lost this case. 
VII. 
SOUTH CAROLINA V. GEORGIA, 93 U. S. 13. 
In this case the Supreme Court, construing the no-preference-port 
clause of the Constitution, held tha t  discrimination a s  between States 
is what is  prohibited, and not discrimination between individual ports, 
and Congress is  not forbidden to make a port in one State a port of 
entry, while refusing to do so as  to a port in another State. 
Georgia won this case. 
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Recovery of Losses on Cotton Futures 
Is one who deposits money with another a s  "margins" fo r  the  pur- 
chase and sale of futures and who loses the money by subsequent fluc- 
lo:~tions of the market, entitled to recover i t ?  
It is well established that  an executory contract for  the sale of 
cotton for future delivery where both parties knew tha t  the vendor 
rspected to purchase to fulfill his contract and to put no skill, labor 
nr expense therein and none entered into the consideration thereof 
Ilut it was a speculation on chances, would be illegal ( I )  but if the 
cnlton was to be bought and delivered a t  once and skill, labor or ex- 
prnse entered into the contract, i t  would be valid. ( 2 )  A later case 
st:ltea the rule thus: The sale of cotton to be delivered a t  a future 
day where both parties are  aware that  the seller himself expects to  
parchase to fulfill his contract and no skill and labor or expense enter 
into t h ~  consideration, but the same is a pure speculation upon chances, 
i:; contrary to the policy of the law and can be enforced by neither 
party. ( : I )  As a general rule when money is paid over upon an  il- 
Icngnl contract it cannot be recovered back, the contract being executed 
and both parties in pari delicto. ( 4 )  This is  the  common law rule, 
but as is so often the case statutes have nullified it. Section 4256 of 
- -- -- - - 
1 Warren Lane & Co. v. Hewitt 45 G.a. 502. 
"ranch v. Palmer, 65 Ga. 210. 
3 Thompson v. Cummi~ngs, 68 Ga. 124. 
4 Ingram v. Mitchell, 30 Ga. 547. 
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the Civil Code of 1910 provides that money paid upon a gaming con- 
sideration may be recovered back from the winner by the loser if he 
shall sue for  the same in six months after the loss. Contracts for 
the purchase and sale of cotton futures are  gaming contracts. (j! 
And in Forsyth Mfg. Co. vs. Sastlen the Supreme Court said that if it 
i s  the intention of both parties to the contract that the goods shall 
not be actually delivered but that there shall be a settlement of the 
differences between them according to the market price of the article 
on a given day, such a contract would be a wager and not enforcable 
by either party. (6 )  A recent decision holds, however, that a con- 
tract fo r  the sale of futures is not a gaming contract within the mean- 
ing of the Code Section cited above. (7) Consequently money paid 
under such a contract may not be recovered back by the loser. (8) 
The Court in the case just referred to was able to determine the 
intention of the lawmakers by examining the statute from which the 
Code Section was codified. These were the Acts of 1764 and 1765, (0)  
which provided that persons who lose money or goods by playing or 
betting a t  any game whatever might maintain against the winner a 
suit  to recover the money or  goods so lost. I t  seems quite evident 
that  buying or selling futures is not a "game," especially since dealing 
in futures is treated by the statutes and the Code, separately from 
other forms of gaming. It is interesting to note that  the same con- 
clusion as  that reached in Lassiter vs. O'Neill was held by the Su- 
preme Court on different grounds before the adoption of the present 
Code. (lo) 
So another peculiarity has been pointed out in the provision of 
our law set forth in Code Section 4256 which has always been a legal 
freak. Broad as a re  the expressions used in that  section they do not 
cover the most pernicious form of gaming. 
Argument of Counsel 
"Argument of counsel shall be confined to the law and the facts 
involved in the case then before the court, on pain of being considered 
in contempt; and in all civil cases questions of law shall be argued 
exclusively to the court, and questions of fact to the jury. Civil Code 
of Georgia, 1910. 
Par t ies  have a right to appear by counsel, and i t  i s  a privilege 
of counsel to address the jury on the facts. The arguments of counsel 
a s  to the facts of a case, and the conclusions to  be reached from the 
proven facts, is not to be considered as  mere argument tending to 
sway the jury in its performance of its sworn duty, but should rather 
be considered as  an aid,-as a very valuable aid given by one whose 
duty it is to assist the jury in reaching a proper conclusion upon a 
proven basis of facts. 
It is  held in the case of Daly vs. Hines, 55 Ga. 470 that "Argu- 
6 Cunningham v. National Bank of Augusta,  71 Ga. 400. 61 Am. Rep. 266. 
0 Forsyth  Mfg. Co. v. Castlen, 1 1 2  Ga. 199, 37 S .  E. 785. 
7 Section 4256. 
8 Lassiter v. O'Neill. 13'5 S. E. 78. 
9 Cobb 725-727. 
10  Thompson v. Cumming, 68 Ga. 124. 
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ment is not only a right, but a material one. It is  not a mere orna- 
mental fringe upon the border of a trial." 
The object of the argument is  first, that of an  aid to the court, 
and second, that of an  aid to  the jury. 
1. Appearance by counsel, is an  aid to the court in the ascertain- 
ment and application of the law, however profound the learning or 
admirable the wisdom of the Bench.***The object is not to secure, 
by management, or trick, o r  dexterity, against the law and against 
the evidence.*** Such is not the legitimate object of appearance by 
 counsel.+;^^ I t s  object is to aid in the ascertainment of the truth- 
in the strict, and, therefore, equitable administration of the laws of 
I the land. 
Wynn vs. Lee, 5 Ga. 237. "The true view of the position of the 
counsel, before the jury, is  that  i t  aids or helps. The business of the 
counsel is to comment on the evidence-to sift, compare and collate 
the facts-to draw his illustrations from the whole circle of the 
sciences-to reason with the accuracy and power of the trained logi- 
cian, and enforce his cause with all the inspiration of genius, and 
adorn i t  with all the attributes of eloquence. It is the business of the 
jury to listen, to be informed, but not to obey.*.*"." Garrison vs. 
Wilcoxson 11 Ga. 159. 
"Remarks of counsel while addressing the jury, which do not 
undertake to introduce any material fact not disclosed by the evidence, 
but which a re  merely oratorical in character, do not constitute suf- 
ficient ground for  declaring a mistrial." Western & Atlantic Rail- 
road Co. vs. York 128 Ga. 687. 
In the above mentioned case the remarks made by counsel in his 
address to the jury were in substance a s  follows: "Man is the noblest 
creation of God. God made no greater creation than man. He is  the  
grandest product of Divine handicraft; and he hedged about him the 
law 'Thou shalt not kill'.*** 'The statutes of the Lord a re  right'. 
'Thou shalt not kill' i s  the statute of the Lord God Almighty. It was 
made for the protection of the Lord of creation-for man, and i t  ap- 
plies to a railroad corporation just a s  much a s  i t  does to an individual. 
If a man is  dead by the reckless negligence of the servants and 
agents of the railroad corporation, the full consequences to him a re  
the same; he is  just a s  dead as  if he had died by the uplifted and di- 
rected and murderous hand of his brother man. The shedding of in- 
nocent blood is  just the same-just the same. Our land is  defiled 
when innocent blood is shed therein, whether i t  be by the hand of a 
railroad corporation o r  whether i t  be by the murderer's hand or some 
one contending in a death grapple with his brother man; and the curse 
of God, which is  charged against that, i s  upon i t  just the  same. 
Gentlement of the jury, when George W. York died on tha t  public 
crossing in the City of Acworth, last October was a year ago, his in- 
nocent blood stained the right of way of this defendant." These re- 
marks were considered by the court to  be purely impassioned oratori- 
cal eloquence, and considered not prejudicial to the defendant to the 
extent that  a new trial should be granted. 
In an  earlier case, the case of Western and Atlantic Railroad Co. 
vs. Cox. 115 Ga. 712, i t  seems that  the reverse had been held by the 
Supreme court; if not the reverse, there is certainly some dissimilarity 
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between the holding of the court in the two cases. In this case, coun- 
sel fo r  the plaintiff in the lower court, i t  being an action for damages 
fo r  wrongful death, in his argument to the jury used the following 
expression: "The only way to reach a railroad is to make i t  pay 
money. A railroad has no soul, no conscience, no sympathy and no 
God." Upon these statements being made counsel for  defendant 
asked that the  jury be retired, and moved the court to declare a mis- 
trial  on the ground that  the language was inflamatory and improper. 
The judge in the lower court refused to do so, and i t  is held by the 
Supreme court that  the lower court erred in so doing. 
In  the case of Patterson vs. the State. 124 Go. 409, the follow- 
ing words were used by the solicitor-general in his argument to the 
jury: "The blood of this dead man calls upon you to punish this man 
and protect his family and relatives; and unless you have the man- 
hood to write ik in your verdict, you should be exiled from the good 
county of Heard." Motion for  a mistrial upon this ground was over- 
ruled in the lower court. The Supreme court, in ruling upon the 
question expresses itself a s  follows: "We do not think this language 
called for  a mistrial, or a rebuke from the judge. It introduced no 
fact, but was merely a forcible and possibly an extravagant method 
adopted by counsel of impressing upon the jury the  enormity of the 
offense and the solemnity of their duty in relation thereto.*** Flights 
of oratory and false logic do not call for  mistrials or rebuke. I t  is 
the  introduction of facts not in evidence tha t  requires the application 
of such remedies." 
Attempts to arouse indignation against crime and appeals to the 
jury to show no mercy to crime, but to unflinchingly administer the 
criminal laws a re  not grounds for  a new trial. Nix v. the State 
149 Ga. 309. 
As the logical conclusion to be reached from the foregoing state- 
ments of law, and the cases decided thereunder, i t  seems a s  though 
much is left to the honesty and fairness of the attorney arguing be- 
fore the jury as  to whether o r  not he shall confine himself strictly 
to a logical expounding of the conclusion to be reached from the facts, 
or whether he shall attempt to mislead the jury by forensic eloquence 
and false logic. Oratorical eloquence should be used to  impress the 
jury a s  to  the facts, and to  lead them to a logical conclusion, and not, 
a s  is  so often the case, to  play upon their prejudices and emotions, in 
an  attempt to cause them to reach a verdict not in accordance with 
the law and the facts of the  case. 
Construction and Interpretation of Wills 
The question of the  construction and interpretation of wills 
receives a great deal of attention, the  wording of wills, creating 
estates i n  remainder and reversion, quite often being the  cause of 
litigation. 
An estate in  remainder i s  one limited to  be enjoyed a f te r  an- 
other estate is  determined or  a t  a time specified i n  t h e  furture,  and 
is either vested o r  contingent1. A vested remainder i s  one limited 
1 Civil Code Para. 3674. 
NOTES 47 
to a certain person a t  a certain time or  upon the happening of a 
necessary event. A contingent remainder i s  one limited to a n  un- 
certain person or  upon an  event which may or may not happen2. 
In Georgia, the law favors the vesting of remainders in  all cases of 
doubt, and in the construction of wills, words of survivorship shall 
refer to  the death of the testator in order to  vest remainders, unless 
a manifest intention to the contrary appears3. Of course, in  all 
cases, the intention of the testator is sought, and the court gives 
effect to the same a s  f a r  a s  i t  may be consistent with the rules of 
law4. The question of whether a testator manisfestly intends that  
words of survivorship should refer to  the death of another in a giv- 
en case will depend upon the language of the will. 
The use of the word "then" in wills i s  perhaps the revolving 
point in most of the controversies. I n  the case of Patterson v. Pat- 
terson i t  was held that  the use of the word "then" in  the will in  
controversy clearly indicated that  a fee simple estate was vested in 
the daughter, subject to  be divested if she died without child or  
children prior to  the death of the life tenantb. 
On the contrary, i t  was held in the case of Roberts v. Wadley 
that the use of the word "then" in  the will manifestly showed that  
there was no uncertainty as  to who should take under the will and 
that the remainder vested indefeasibly in  the persons appointed to 
takes. 
In the earlier case of Dudley v. Porter, words of survivorship 
expressed in a will were held to refer to  the death of one other than 
the grantor7. The word "then" in this will was equivalent to  the 
expression "in that  event." In  this case there was a repugnancy 
between two clauses of the will and i t  was held that  the f i rs t  should 
govern, since where two clauses a re  in irreconcilable contradiction 
to each other, the f i rs t  shall prevail. 
When, however, the latter clause is in  explanation of the for- 
mer, then the latter clause i s  not repugnant to  the former, and the 
former may be controlled by it. I n  Georgia, where construction 
does not favor estates tail and where estates tail have long been 
prohibited, words of limitation over af ter  a failure of issue a t  the  
death, may explain words in the instrument previously used, which 
import an  intention to create a n  estate tail. The law of Georgia 
inhibits entails, and by the act  of 1821 (Cobb's Digest 169) endorses 
the inhibition by enlarging them into estates in fee simple. 
The recent case of Ethridge v. Leaptrot e t  al. clearly demon- 
strates the unbroken line of decisions where words of survivorship 
manifestly refer to the death of another than the testators. In thia 
case the testator devised lands in t rust  for  the use of L., the wife of 
the testaor's son J., and the children of L., living and thereafter 
2 Civil Code Para. 3676. 
3 Civil Code Para. 3680, Moore v. Cook, 153 Ga. 840 (113 S. E. 536). 
4 Oivil Code Para. 3900. 
6 147 Ga. 44 (92 S. E. 882). 
6 156 Ga. 35. 
7 16 Oa. 613. 
8 134 S. E. 298. 
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born, by her or other lawful wife that  J. may have, and provided 
tha t  should L. predecease J., then her interest should go to child- 
ren of J., and on death of J. and wife trust should terminate and 
property should go to children then living of J., and i t  was rightly 
held by Judge. Hardeman, who tried the case below, "that the re- 
mainder passed to the children surviving J. and wife or living at  
their death." Plaintiff in error was the child of a daughter of J. 
and L. The child's mother survived the testator, but predeceased 
her parents, J. and L. In this case, the words "then living" clearly 
referred to those children of J. and L. living a t  the death of J. and L. 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 
Recent Decisions 
Husband and Wife; Transfer of Title for Purpose of Obtaining Credit; 
Nobice; Claim. 
An execution in favor of plaintiff and against defendant was levied upon 
a certain tract of land. Thereupon the Mfe of the defendant herein interposed 
a statutory claim and a n  equitable amendment alleging that  the land was her 
Property; that she furnished the money and 'Paid for the land out of her own 
separate money, with the request and understanding that the actual paper 
title was to be made to her and in her name! The husband persuaded her 
to have the title made to him so tha t  upon It he could gain certain credit 
in furtherance of his business operations. The title was ,thus i)n him a t  the 
time of execution and claim and had never been in the claimant. There was 
no evidence to show notice to the plaintiff of the wife's equity. Ne Smith. 
Vs. Calder, #5280 Supreme Court of Ga. 10-13-26. 
The general rule of law covering the point is not specifically codified In 
the statutes of this state, therefore to ascertain the law several code aectione, 
and the decisions thereunder, must be examined. [Section 4526 of the oode 
states that a n  old principle that is appMcaible to  the case at bar, "The equity 
of a party who has been misled is superior to that of him who willfully mis- 
leads him." Further section 4,528 states "Possession of land is notice of 
whatever right o r  title the occupant has. Possession by the husband with the 
wife is presumptively his possession, 'but it may be rebutted." Section 3011 
of the code further shows the law to tbe "A married woman may make con- 
tracts with other .persons; but when a transaction between husband and wtfe 
is attacked for fraud by the creditors of either, the  onus is on the husband 
and wife to show that the transaction was fair. If the wife has a separate 
estate, and purchases property from other persons than her husband, and 
the property is levied on as the property of the husband, the onus is upon 
the creditor to show fraud, or that she did not have the means wherewith 
to purchase the property." 
From the foregoimg statutes it  is clear that in this case the claim of the 
wUe is of no legal effect and cannot therefore attach to the land.In sus- 
tenance of this view and bearing out the clearly defined statutes .the follow- 
ing Georgia cases a re  cited: "If the legal title to land be in the  husband 
and he hold the possession thereof under such .title, and the title and posses- 
sion so  remain until one who has given credit on the faith that the property 
was the husband's, without any  notice of the wife's equity, reduces his debt 
to judgment, the lien of such judgment will bind the land and will I& en- 
forced against a secret equity of the wife, resulting from the fact that  her 
money paid for the land."-Zimmer Vs. Dansby, 58/79. 
The case of Humphrey Vs. Copeland, 541543, is also strictly in  point as is 
Brown Vs. West, 70/201; and Burt Vs. Kuhen, 113/1143. 
I n  Ford Vs. Blackshear Manufacturing Company, 140/670, the court 
said: "If a wife, having a n  equitable title to land to which a deed is taken 
in the name of her husband, permits him to hold the property and use it  
in his ;business and commercial transactions for the purpose of obtaining 
credit, and a third person, without notice of the equity, extends credit to the 
husband on the faith that  the land ie his, the wife, after the creditor has re- 
duced his debt to judgment, will be estopped from asserting title to the land 
a s  against the lien of the judgment, although before rendition of the judg- 
ment the husband, in recognition of the equity, may have conveyed the land 
to her." Also Krueger Vs. MacDougald, 148/429, is directly in point. 
With these cases and the case of The Om Shoe Company Vs. Lee, 159/523, 
which is identical in point we feel that the wife's claim is in effect nil. 
Automobiles-Motor Vehicle Acts-Action by driver of car whkh had 
stopped along highway with bright lights burning against owner of car  which 
approached and collided with the automobile of plaintiff and injuring him. 
Judgment for the plaintiff and by the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed. 
"Standing car  and car approaching from front are  meeting in sense of statute 
requiring mss meeting to turn to the right: Where motor car is !brought to 
a stop along highway and another car approaches it  from in front a r s  a re  
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"meeting" In sense oi laws of 1921, page 257 section 3; Park's Annotated 
Code Supplement of 11922, Section 828 (uu-7), providing that cars meeting 
must turn to the right." Roberts vs. Phillips, 134 Southeastern Reporter, 
Page 837. 
Whenever any operator of a motor vehicle or motorcycle shall meet on 
a public street or highway, any person or persons riding or driving one or 
more horses, or any other draf? animal, or any other vehicle, approaching 
in the opposite direction, the operator shall turn his vehicle to the right a0 
as to give one-half of the traveled roadway, if practimble, and pt fair oppor- 
tunity to the other to  pass by without unnecessary interference; and if trav- 
eling in the same direction, he shall pass to the left side of the person or 
vehicle overtaken, and the person or vehicle overtasken shall give him a fair 
opportunity to pass. Acts of 1921, page 257, sectlon 3; Park's Annotated Code 
Supplement of 1922, Section 828 (uu-8). 
Where driver after bringing automobile t o  stop on left side of highway, 
alighted therefrom and placed himself in front of it, leaving car  atanding 
with headlights #burning, and was run into by approaching car, i t  was error 
to fail to charge that it was duty to operate motor vehicle so as t o  give to 
other operators the right to one-half of he traveled roadway, if practicable. 
Held also tha t  where plaintiff stopped automobile on left-hand side of road and 
on dark and rainy night and was injured by approaching car; it was error 
to fail to charge the jury that it  was the duty of the one operating motor v* 
hicle on dark and rainy night on left-hand side of road to be on alert to  
prevent 4njury to himself o r  to  other persons lawfully on highway. Further 
held that  inasmuch as the  motor vehicle law does not require all motor ve- 
hicles to be equipped with dimmers, the refusal by the court to charge that  
irt was the duty of the plaintiff to have automobile so equipped, did not con- 
stitute error. 
Husband and wif~Alimony-Dowe1'-Y~'s  SupportEquit&le Can&- 
lation of Deed-Husband's Conveyance to Defeat Wife's Riglit of Alimony- 
Return of Wife and Child to  Home of Husband ancl Father. A husband in 
order to  defeat the claim of his wife for alimony for herself and for her minor 
child, executed a conveyance purporting to convey all of his interest in  cer- 
tain lands t o  his mother, for  a valmlAe consideration, and the deed was duly 
recorded. Subsequently the  husband drove his wife and the minor child from 
his home, whereupon the wife instigated her suit for alimony for herself and 
her child. The husband, fearing exposure, sent for his wife and child and 
they being in ipnorance of said deed returned to his home and Itved with him 
until he died. Action was brought by wife on her own behalf and a s  next 
friend for her minor child against the mother of her deceased husband pray- 
ing that said deed be cancelled and set aside and asking for general relief; 
HELD, tha t  the court did not err in dismissing the amended petition upon 
general demurrer. "Husband's deed, executed to defeat claim for alimony 
cannot be caqcelled in equity where wife returned to husband's home and 
lived with him until his death, rendering judgment for alimony impossible." 
The petition alleged that the  sole purpose of the execution of the deed was 
to defeat plaintiff's right of alimony, and since the cruel treatment on the 
part of the husband was condoned by the wife by her returning to him and 
the contemplated suit for alimony was abandoned, and the husband had de- 
parted this life, no judgment for alimony could ever be rendered. Such judg- 
ment being imp~ssi~ble, therefore equity has no jurisdiction or power to can- 
cel the deed. Held also that there is no statute in Georgia, prohibiting the 
husband's voluntary conveyance to defeat his wife's right of dower, save as 
to lands to which title came through her. There being in this State no statute 
inhtbiting the sale of land by the husband for the purpose of defeating his 
wife's claim of dower, save as to lands to  which the title came through her. 
a n  actual sale and conveyance, although made for the purpose of defeating 
dower, will be upheld in favor of the purchaser against the widow's claim 
after the death of the husband. Sorrells vs. Sorrells, 134 S. E. 767, Harber 
st a1 vs. Harber, 152 Georgia 93 (3) Flowers vs. Flowers 89 Georgia 632. In  
this respect a voluntary conveyance stands upon the same footing and has 
the same effect a s  a conveyance based upon a n  actual sale. Pruett vs. Cow- 
sa r t  138 Georgia 756. In  thie case i t  was held in part, that a voluntary con- 
veyance by a husband of land in which he had an undivided interest as heir 
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of a former wife, would defeat the claim of dower asserted by his second wife 
after his death, notwi.thstanding that such conveyance redted that a part of 
the consideration was that the grantor was to remain in possession of the 
lands and receive the benefits as long as  he lived. 
Wife need not join in deed of husband to land not derived through her 
or from her, ,in order to ,bar dower. 92 Georgia 260: On issue whether hus- 
!band's deed defeating dower was bona fide, his will, subsequently executed, 
in which he made no provision for his wife, would not be relevant. 89 Geor- 
gia 632 (3): The Supreme court in the 89th. Georgia page 632, held that so 
long as the conveyance was bona fide, it mattered not that the purchase mon- 
ey remains unpaid. Prior to the act of 1826 the widow was entitled to dower 
out of all land of which husband was seized during coverture. The Supreme 
Court has also held that a .sale by a sheriff after the death of the husband 
under execution against him, does not divest the widow of her right of dower 
and that the purchaser a t  such sale takes the land subject thereto. Bee, 
121 Georgia 429. 
Bills and Notes-Genuineness of Inclorsement. 
A suit filed by a n  insurance company in the U. S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia set up that the company issued a number of 
drafts on itself payable to named persons; that these were each presented by 
the defendant bank for payment apparently indorsed by t,he proper payees 
and payment made and the clrafts taken up; but i t  was later discovered by 
the insurance company that each payee indorsement was a forgery and 
promptly thereafter demand was made on the banlc for repayment of the en- 
tire sum as money had and received, and in a second count as damages for 
breach of a n  implied warranty of title and right to collect the drafts. One 
of the defenseses set up hy the answer was tha t  the loss to the company was 
due to its own negligence in issuing and paying the drafts over so long a 
period of time without discovery of the forgeries. General and special de- 
murrers to this plea were filed and sustained. The Court holding: 
The drawee, who iR also the drawer of a draft, presented for payment by 
a ,bank with the names of the payees indorsed thereon is not bound to know 
the genuineness 01 .the indorsements or to make. inquiry before payment, but 
a s  between them presentation of the draft by the bank is an implied war- 
ranty that by genuine indorsements it is the true holder and en.titled to col- 
lect it. Insurance Company of North America vs. Fourth National Bank 
of Atlanta 12  Fed. (2d) 100. 
The relation here should be distinguished from that of banlc and depositor. 
1 Leather Manufacturers vs. 'Merchants Bank 128 U. S. 26. Where one ac- 
cepts forged paper purporting to be his own and pays it to a holder for value 
received he cannot recover the payment. 2 8 C. J. 606. U. S. Bank vs. Geor- 
gia Bank 6 L. Ed. 334. 1 0  Wheat or 333. By requesting payment of a draft 
a holder impliedly warrants that he has a good title and a right to  sell. 3 Gt% 
Code 4277 ' L a t h e r  Manufacturers Bank 128 U. S. 26. Since this is true. it 
follavs .that where payment is made to a person holding an instrument under 
a forgecl indorsement, the person paying the same may recover the payment 
from him. 4 Yatesville Banking Co. vs. Atlanta Fourth National Bank 10 Ga. 
Appeals 1. 72 S. 'E. 528 Hartman vs. Henshaw 1 3  L. Ed. 653. The drawee 
owes no duty to the holder to examine and ascertain whether the indorsements 
were genuine. 5 Oommissioners Evchange Bank vs. Nassau Bank 91  N. Y. 74. 
A transferee of securities is not bound to notify the transferor of a lack of 
genuineness of the securities or of the title thereto, until the lapse of a reas- 
onable time after the discovery of the fact. 6 U. S. Bank vs. Bank Fed. 855. 
The diligence required is not in making the discovery but in giving notice 
thereafter. 7 U. S. vs. Clinton Nat. Bank 159 P. A. 46, 23 L. R. A. 615. 
The principles set forth in these cases have apparently been taken for 
granted in  Georgia or a t  l a s t  most of them ,have never been' adjudicated prdb- 
ably because the questions have never arisen. 
SALES--Failure of consicleration and implied \\ra.rtxnties in Sale. 
Felder vs. Neeves. Court of Appeals of Georgia Oct. 13, 1926. 135 South 
Eastern reporter gags 219. 
Action for price of goods where defendant pleaded failure of consideration 
and breach of warranty in that the machinery was unsuited for purpose in- 
tended. 
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Hardee vs. Carter, 94 Da. 482. An action for the purchase price of goods 
cannot be altogether defeated by a plea of total failure of consideration, unless 
the evidence shows tha.t they were totally worthless for any purposes. 
Trippe vs. McLain 87 Ga. 536. Where. a s  in the instant case, the evidence 
clearly shows that the machine which was the subject matter of the contract 
could have been repaired a t  a reasonable cost, and when so repaired, would 
,have performed the service for which i t  was purchased, a general finding 
Of the jury in favor of the defendant oi his plea of total failure of considera- 
tion is not supported by the evidence and must be set aside. 
Compton vs. Woodruff, Ga. App. 803. 1An express warranty excludes a n  
implied warranty of the same or  a closely related subject, but not a n  im- 
plied warranty on a n  entirely different suibject. 
Barber vs. Singletary 13 Ga. App. 171. Thus where the defense ex- 
clusively relied upon the  breach of a n  express warranty, the judge should 
not charge upon the subject of implied warranty. 
In  a suit for the purohase price of machlnery, while the defendant cannot 
claim the benefit of 'both a n  alleged spedal warranty as to ,quality and the 
general warranty implied (by the law to exlst in the absence of express war- 
ranty, he nevertheless is entltled to set up inconsistent pleas and  claim the 
benefit of such deferme as he may, under the proof, be entitled to, and where, 
as here the defendant pleads a n  express warranty whereby the seller guaran- 
teed that the engine was capa~ble of performilng work of a particular kind and 
character, and  also set  up that the machinery bargained for wae totally un- 
suited for the purposes for which it was intended to be used, the judge did 
not err  in charging the law governing express warranties a s  controlling in the 
case, in the event the jury should find there was such a n  agreement, and In 
thereafter charging the jury what would be the alternative rule, under the 
law of implied warranty in event that  they should find in favor of the plain- 
tiff's contention that no such express warranty had been actually made. 
Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff ibrings error. Reversed. 
Parties Suit on Note, Transferee and Transferor. 
McMillian vs. Spencer. Supreme Court of Georgia Sept. 18, 1926. 136 
Southeastern Reporter 182. 
The plaintiff suing as transferee of the note did not join the tmnsferor 
(the payee named in the note) a s  party defendant. The defendants answer 
admitted execution of the note, and pleaded in avoidance thereof tha t  the 
note was executed without consideration, that the plaintiff was not a bona tide 
holder for value, but that he had received it under a collusive arrange- 
ment with the transferor to protect the latter as a n  innocent holder against 
the defense of the maker. I t  was not certain that the defense would be 
sustained a s  against the plaintiff, even conceding that the note was without 
consideration; consequently the defendant amended his answer so a s  to set 
up a claim for judgment over against the transferor if the defendant should 
be held lbble to the plaintiff, and to that end prayed that  the transferor be 
made a party defendant. It was upon order allawing this amendment that  the 
bill of exceptions assigns error. Judgment affirmed. 
Code Section 6410. 
A, defendant to any suit or  claimm in the .Superior Court, whether such sult 
be for legal or equitable relief, may claim legal or equttarble relief, or rboth, 
by framing proper pleadings for the purpose, and sustaining them by euf- 
ficient evidence. 
Code Section 5411. 
Any defendant may also ff it is necessary to  obtain complete relief, make 
necessary parties. 
Code Section ,5406. 
The 'Superior Courts of this State, on the trial of any civil m e ,  shall 
give effect to all the right8 of the parties, legal o r  equitable or  ,both, and 
apply on such trial remedies or  relief, legal or equitable or both, in favor of 
either party, such as the nature of the case may allow or  require. 
54/310. Third persons whose rights are  involved in equibble plea, may 
be made party. 
61/113, 117. Superior Court has jurisdiction under thls section to pro- 
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ceed to do justice when all parties of interest a re  before it. 
Code Section 6408. 
Any person claiming equitable relief may make all necessary parties to  
secure equihble relief, either a t  the beginning of his suit or afterwards by 
amendment; and nlay make amendment in matter or form or substance. 
124/165. Owner of land may be made party to suit to recover property 
brought in name oi one who had collusion with owner of land. 
56/222. Parties being necessary which could be added in equity only, 
equity will enjoin proceeding a t  law and administer proper relief. 
Those laws make radical changes in the law relating t o  procedure and 
there can be no doubt, from application of plain language of these statutes, 
that the defendant had the right to  set up the matter urged and relied on 
in his plea. and also to have the transferor made a party for the purpose of 
molding a n  appropriate decree against him as the facts may justify. I t  is 
urged that the amendment should not have  been allowed, as the plaintiff 
should not be delayed on account of any  issue between the defendant and the 
tmnsferor. If that  would make a difference, the plaintiff in this is not com- 
plaining and it would not afford the transferor and ground of complaint. 
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Cases on Constitutional Law 
(With Supplement) 
BY JAMES PARKER HALL 
Professor of Law, and Dean of the University of Chicago Law School 
West Publishing Co., 1926 
The latest edition of Dean Hall's excellent work on Constitu- 
tional Law is  enhanced in value by an up-to-date supplement. 
The book, which is one of the American Casebook Series, cites 
decisions taken from both Federal and State statutes. In  compiling 
a number of cases that will clearly explain the principles as  set 
forth in our Constitution, the author has been forced to use an 
abundance of material, and in order to confine his work to one vol- 
ume, he has found i t  necessary, not only to omit all argument of 
counsel, but in many instances, in order to condense them, to re- 
write facts. 
As explained in the preface, in order to meet the requirements 
of the teacher, the book has been arranged in short chapters. 
The book proper is divided into three parts. 'Preliminary Topics', 
constitutes the first  par t ;  'Fundamental Rights', the second; 'The 
Federal Government', the third. 
The first  main-division is opened by a series of cases explaining 
the making of various constitutions throughout the nation, and also 
cites cases under the head of changes in the constitutions. The next 
subject taken up is  the 'Function of the Judiciary in Enforcing 
Constitutions', and the opening division is concluded with, 'Separa- 
tion and Delegation of Powers of Government'. 
The second division clearly explains each of the fundamental 
rights, as  set forth, in the Constitution of the United States. 
In the third division is  found an  outstanding feature in the 
book. This feature is the chapter on Federal procedure, which 
might easily be used a s  a text on a short course on that  subject. 
The supplement, which in itself includes some 400 pages, is 
arranged in the same manner a s  the main book. The supplement 
includes an additional chapter on the much mooted question of 
National Prohibition, and cites many of the conflicting decisions 
on the aforesaid question. 
The book is  spite of i ts  excellent qualities, is  necessarily, be- 
cause of the subject, bulky, and can hardly be fitted in the average 
short law course. The writer, however, expresses the hope of re- 
ducing the size in a later edition. 
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CASES ON CODE PLEADING. BY ARCHIBALD H. THROCK- 
MORTON, PROFESSOR O F  LAW IN WESTERN RESERVE UNI- 
VERSITY. WEST PUBLISHING CO., ST. PAUL, MINN. 
This case book contains a collection of cases and other mater- 
ial f o r  the use of the lawyer and student. Professor Throckmor- 
ton unquestionably has given us one of the most practical treatises 
of the  system of Code Pleading. This  book gives us  many cases 
that  the student may obtain the more important rules and princi- 
ples, a s  those principles a r e  thus  found in  the  codes of t he  different 
States. 
  he preference in the  section of cases has  been given t o  the 
most important ones, by which the system of code pleading has  
evolved and reached its present day development. New York in  
1848, was the  f i rs t  state to adopt the system; now there  a r e  more 
than thirty S t a t e s  tha t  use Code Pleading. Mr. Throckmorton has 
inserted in  the  notes, information a s  t o  the rules in the several jur- 
isdictions and reference to  cases, magazines, and articles containing 
discussion that  will be helpful to  the student. 
We know the importance of pleading, and the subject of code 
pleading is  constantly growing in importance, the  tendency of most 
states i s  to simplify and remove the burdensome technicalities t ha t  
existed with the Old Common Law form of pleading, and a s  a result 
many obstacles have been removed which otherwise would cause 
delay and unnecessary expense. 
Professor Throckmorton has given us a n  admirable work tha t  
will meet with the  approval of all  who wish to  learn more upon the 
subject. The one volume consists of 912 pages, including a thor- 
ough index. The price is  $5.50 per copy. The contents a r e  a s  
follows : 
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